Space Strategies Center

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SSA-T

Space Situational Awareness Tools

- Wargaming Capabilities -

7 December, 2013

"You may not be interested in war ... but war is interested in you." (Leon Trotsky)

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SSA-T Purpose

- Develop Space Warfare Theory, Doctrine, Strategies, Tactics, Techniques & Tools that Enable Informed Decision Making by Space Control Warfighters:
 - Will Space Systems be Under Attack In the Near Future?
 - Are Space Systems Currently Under Attack?
 - Who Is Attacking?
 - What is the Adversary Attack Strategy?
 - What Damage Has Been Caused to Military Capabilities?
 - What Is Optimal Blue Military/Diplomatic/Economic Response?

Provides a "Unified Field Theory" for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) & Satellite Attack Warning (SAW)

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SSA-T Wargame Purpose

- Develop Future Space Warfare Theory, Doctrine, Strategies, Tactics, and Techniques that Enable Informed Decision Making by Space Control Warfighters
- Train Space Warfighters to Recognize Covert Attacks on Space Systems
- Train Space Warfighters On How to Defend Their Space Assets
- Train Space Warfighters to Fight and Win Space Wars
- Determine Required Future Technologies for Offensive and Defensive Space Weapon Systems
- Develop Procedures, Forms, Documentation and Organizational Relationships to Fight and Win Space Wars
- Provides a Basic Space Warfare Command and Control System
- Provides Space Weapons Employment Optimization Tools


Space Wargame Trains our Future Space Warfighters

SSA-T Wargame Main Attributes

- Realistic VS Typical Consumer Space Video Game
- Heavily Operational Orientated
- Unusually Detailed with All Aspects of Space Warfare:
 - Obscure Battlefield (Many Unknowns) with Sensor Tasking & Search Optimization Tools
 - Uncertainty (Random Within Bounds) Capabilities
 - Ground, Air, Sea and Space Current & Future Systems
 - Varied Phenomenology Space Weapons
 - Space Courses Of Action (COA's) Development Tools with Formatted Message Generation
 - Unique Space Attack Warning (SAW) Visualization Screens

Most Complete Space Warfare Gaming Tools In Existence

SSA-T Process Flow



SSA-T Products Listed Inside Boxes

SSA-T Provides an Integrated Space Warfare Conceptual Framework

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SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (1)

- Define / Review Future Space Warfare Terminology (Acronyms & Glossary)
- Define / Review Future Space Warfare Doctrine, Strategies, Tactics, Space Principles of War, Space Centers of Gravity, etc.

Develop Space Warfare Basics

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SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (2)

Setup Wargame

- Define Country Alignments
 - Blue
 - Red
 - Gray
- Define Areas of Responsibility (AOR's)
 - Terrestrial
 - Orbital Regions

Set Country Space Budgets

 Randomized Space Budgets Limit What Each Player Can Purchase In Space Systems & Weapons

Define Wargame Parameters

SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (3)

- Chose Notional Future Space Systems
 - Define Space Support Systems
 - COMM
 - Imagery
 - NAV
 - Terrestrial Space Systems
 - Ground Fixed/Mobile
 - Aircraft
 - Ship
 - Submarine

- Define Space Weapon Systems

- Terrestrial Weapons Directed Towards Space
- Space-to-Space Weapons
- Space-to-Earth Weapons

Develop Space Systems Used In Wargame

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SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (4)

- Randomize Notional Space Systems
 - Randomize Military Value, Quantities, Costs, Characteristics, Locations, Orbits, Visibility to Red Sensors
 - Allows Randomized (Within User-Selected Min/Max Limits)
 Types, Quantities & Effectiveness for Those Systems Allocated by the computer to Each Side
- Select & Randomize the Probability Players Can View Individual INTEL Reports on Opposing Side Activities
- Chose Real Space Systems
 - Link Real Satellite Orbits (2 Line Element Sets) With Notional Future Satellites

Make Sure Game Play Has Random Factors Within User Defined Min-Max Limits

SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (5)

- Chose Military Events
 - Set Degree With Which Each Side Has a Probability of Viewing His Opponent's Activities
 - Randomize (Within User Selected Min-Max Bounds) Military Events & Probabilities of Being Viewed

Determine Wargame Player Events

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SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (6)

• Execute Wargame

- Review Received Randomized INTEL Report Messages
- Detect / Determine / Assess Opposing Side Space Courses Of Action (COA's)
 - Task / Optimize Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sensor Collection Strategies / Allocations
 - Review Historical Satellite Reliability & Natural Outages Probabilities
 - Review Historical Satellite Uncorrelated Target (UCT) Rates
 - Run SSA-T State Change Tools to Automatically Detect Adversary Satellite Attitude Changes & Orbital Maneuvers
 - Review & Assess Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) Orbital Situation Maps
- Develop Blue Space COA's & Military Objectives

Play Wargame

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SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (7)

- Space Weaponeering Optimizations
 - Calculate All Possible Multiple Satellite Attacks Against Multiple Targets Within Military Objectives Time Constraints
 - Choose Those Satellite Attacks That Fulfill Military Objectives Within Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Constraints & Commander's Intent While Limiting Maneuvering Fuel Expended
 - Optimization Parameters:
 - Minimize Maneuvering Fuel
 - Minimize Transit Time
 - Minimize Sun Angles (Keep as Dark as Possible)
 - Maximize Overflights of Friendly Satellite Ground Stations / Sensors
 - Minimize Overflights of Adversary Satellite Ground Stations / Sensors
 - Align On-Target Times Within Military Objectives & Other Orbital Attacks (Maximize Shock Value & Overload Adversary Ground Controllers)
 - Assess Cost Exchange & Military Value Ratios
 - Assess Probabilities of Kill & Multiple Strike or Re-Strike Options

Direct Wargame Weapons Fires

SSA-T Wargaming Process Flow (8)

 Determine Weapons Effects, Conduct Additional Situational Assessment & Re-Target

Determine Net Balance of Power in Space

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Main SSA-T Screen Shots

Actual SSA-T Wargame Menus

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
Main SSA-T Menu

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
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Main SSA-T Wargaming Menu




Setup Space Wargame Menu



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
Designate Wargame Country Alignments



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
Set Country Space Budgets



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
View Situation Maps




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View Wargame Terrestrial Boundary Maps




View Wargame Space Boundary Maps (1)



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View Wargame Space Boundary Maps (2)



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
Wargame Notional Space Systems Development

Future Space Systems Employed in Wargame

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Setup Notional Space Systems Randomized Characteristics (1)



Close to 600 Different Space Systems (Current & Future) Templates

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Notional Space Systems (2)

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Notional Space Systems (3)

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Capabilities & Locations of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (4)

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Visibilities to Sensors of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (5)

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Notional Space Systems (6)

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Indicator-5 4 Gr	round object has large power supp	bly	• 0.60	0.83	0.90	Indicator 5 Probability of	Detteedon	Propulsion Thermal	Antennas	
	round object is emanating high RF			0.86	0.95	Indicator 6 Probability of	Detection	Attitude	Solar Panels	
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Some Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomly Obscured to Other Side

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Notional Space Systems (7)

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Indicator-2	Facility has extensive space infrastructure		0.60	0.94 0.90	Indicator 2 Probability of Detection				
Indicator-3 4	Highly educated employees Facility work oriented towards space technolo	.▼	0.50	0.68 0.90	Indicator 3 Probability of Detection	Weap	on Effects		
Indicator-5 5	SIGINT traffic indicates military space facility	ogies 💌	0.10	0.70 0.80	Indicator 5 Probability of Detection		Anternas		
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Notional Space Systems (8)

Home Create External Data Database Tools Add-Ins Fore Create External Data Database Tools Add-Ins Fore Space Games Switchboard Space Games Data Development Space Games Data Development Space Games Data Development Space Games Database Tools Space Games Database Space Games Space Games Database Space Games Database Space Games Space Games Database Space Games Database Games Database Space Games Space Games Database Games Space Games	© ×
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Visibility to Optical 0.72 0.80 Killishols 0 0 0 maneuvers near a target satellite to determine its true purpose and missions. Visibility-OCS 8.0 10.9 12.0 mag Killitime 0 0 res	
Rank Comments	
Indicator-1 5 Large space object is detected 🔍 0.50 0.56 0.80 Indicator 1 Probability of Detection	
Indicator-2 4 Space object has very large optical payload system on-board 🔍 0.60 0.51 Indicator 2 Probability of Detection	
Indicator -3 3 Space object is maneuvering a lot 😨 0.50 0.70 0.80 Indicator 3 Probability of Detection Weapon Effects Indicator -4 1 Space object is conducting RPO's against high-value space assets 🔍 0.50 0.57 0.60 Indicator 4 Probability of Detection 🏹 Peener	
Indicator -4 1 Space object is conducting RPO's against high-value space assets - 0.50 0.57 0.80 Indicator 4 Probability of Detection V Hower V Simuthare Indicator -5 2 Space object orienting itself towards high-value space assets - 0.60 0.66 0.90 Indicator 5 Probability of Detection V Antennes	
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Priorities & Military Value of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (9)

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Rank				Baseline	Indicator 1 Drobability of Dataset	Comments		
Indicator-1 5 Indicator-2 1	Space object has small solar arrays Space object has small antennas on			0.62 0.95	Indicator 1 Probability of Detection Indicator 2 Probability of Detection			
Indicator-3 4	Space object is maneuvering a lot			0.55 0.90	Indicator 3 Probability of Detection	Manual T		
Indicator-4 2	Space object is maneuvering near H			0.74 0.90	Indicator 4 Probability of Detection	Weapon Effects		
Indicator-5	Space object not in public space cat	talog 🔍	0.60	0.65 0.90	Indicator 5 Probability of Detection	🔽 Propulsion 🔽 Ante		
Indicator-6 6	SIGINT traffic indicates military space	ce system 💌	0.10	0.39 0.80	Indicator 6 Probability of Detection	 ✓ Thermal ✓ Optic ✓ Attitude ✓ Solar 		
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Capabilities of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (10)



Notional Space Systems (11)

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n Pane	Bandwidth-TTC-Spa		S-Band	\ ح	Vulnerability-Jammer	0.70	0.70	0.90	EPOCH-Month	6	6	6		
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viga	Base Surveillance-R		0.0	0.0		0.10	0.13	0.30	EPOCH-Hour	0	0	0		
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	Visibility-R		0.1	0.5 d	iBsm Kill-Power	0	0	0	Nano-sized space	mine with op	tical and electronic sens tellite, then paints its s	sors that		
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	Visibility-C		20.3	22.0 m	nag Kil-lime	1,200	3,073 Baseline	3,600	sec temporarily disab	les the satellin				
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	Indicator-2 4	Space object has s	small optical payload	sys Indicator 1	1 that this system ex	hibits that can b	e sensed extern	ally 0.90	Indicator 2 Probability	of Detection				
	Indicator-3 3	Space object is ma	aneuvering a lot		•	0.50	0.80	0.80	Indicator 3 Probability	of Detection	Weapor	1 Effects		
	Indicator-4 1	Space object is co	nducting RPO's agai	inst high-value s	space assets 🔍	0.50	0.58	0.80	Indicator 4 Probability	of Detection	Power	Sinucture		
	Indicator-5 2	Space object orien	nting itself towards h	nigh-value space	e assets 🔍 💌	0.60	0.64	0.90	Indicator 5 Probability	of Detection	Propulsion	Antennes		
	Indicator-6 6	Space object is chi	anging attitude			0.60	0.72	0.90	Indicator 6 Probability	of Detection	Themal Atilitade	 ✓ Optics ✓ Solar Panels 		
	Indicator-7 7	Space object has r	not been previously	cataloged	•	0.10	0.16	0.40	Indicator 7 Probability	of Detection				
	Indicator-8	SIGINT traffic indic	cates military space	system	•	0.10	0.50	0.80	Indicator 8 Probability	of Detection				
	Indicator-9 0					0.00	0.00	0.00	Indicator 9 Probability	of Detection		Trans Lunar		
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Intelligence Indicators Identifying Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (12)

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Indicator-2 2 Space object has large optical payload system on-board 🔍 0.60 Indicator 1 probability (0 to 1) that it can be sensed - value used	
Indicator-3 6 Space object is maneuvering a lot 0.50 0.62 0.90 Indicator 3 Probability of Detection Weapon Effects	
Indicator 4 3 Space object orienting itself towards the Earth 💽 0.50 0.88 0.90 Indicator 4 Probability of Detection 🗸 New Simultane	
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Notional Space Systems (13)

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Notional Space Systems (14)

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Indicator-2 2	Facility has extensive refueling infrastro	ucture 💌	0.60	0.98 0.90	Indicator 2 Probability of Detection				
Indicator-3	Launch gantries detected			0.63 0.90	Indicator 3 Probability of Detection	Weap	n Effects		
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
Notional Space Systems (15)

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	e launches detected	0.60		licator 5 Probability of Detection	Propulsion Antennes Themel Diplics		
	ched missiles have entered outer space IT traffic indicates military space system			licator 6 Probability of Detection	🗌 Attilude 📄 Solar Parek		
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Notional Space Systems (16)



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Notional Space Systems (17)

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✓ 30 yr Altitude	0	0	0 k	m Launcher-Type	M	1obile Missiles-Sub		Indination		0.0	0.0 deg	
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Indicator-2	Sub has large missile		cture	•	0.50	0.74	0.90	Indicator 2 Probability				
Indicator-4	Sub orienting itself to			•	0.50	0.83	0.90	Indicator 3 Probability		Wea	pon Effects	
Indicator-5 5	Missile launches dete				0.60	0.68	0.90	Indicator 5 Probability		Propulsion	Antennes	
Indicator-6 6	Launched missiles ha		r space		0.60	0.80	0.90	Indicator 6 Probability		🗌 Thermal	C Optics	
Indicator-7 7	Sub is operating in s				0.60	0.72	0.90	Indicator 7 Probability		Attitude	Solar Panels	
Indicator-8	Sub is unusually stat	le		•	0.40	0.57	0.60	Indicator 8 Probability	ofDetection			
Indicator-9	SIGINT traffic indica	tes military space	system		0.10	0.40	0.80	Indicator 9 Probability	of Detection		HEO	
Indicator-10	Large sub is detecte	d			0.60	0.85	0.90	Indicator 10 Probabilit	of Detection	GED	Earth	
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
Military Value of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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
Notional Space Systems (18)



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Notional Space Systems (19)



Operational Timelines of Space Systems (Terrestrial & Orbital) Randomized

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Notional Space Systems (20)

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IOC System Age		9 🖵 15 🖵	Procurement Cos	t \$200 M	\$406 M	\$500 M	≸M Icon			Photo			
10 Yr LAT		0.0 0.0	den Mass	500	Baseline	3,200 ka	g SMA		Baseline 7,140	Max 7,580 km			
20 Yr		0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	deg Mass	800	2,449	1,100 m	g SMA		7,140 0.0050	7,580 km			
30 yr Altitude		0.0 0.0	km Launcher-Type		N/A		Inclination		99.2	99.2 dec	20		
Highlight Max Range		0 0	km Launcher-Time	10	19	24 h		0			hat is the Inclination of its orbit (in degrees). Sun-Synchronous Inclination = 99	.03866635	
			Satellite-Time	72.0	123	336 h	rs ARG	0	213	359 deg	-		
Bandwidth-Space-Gnd		Band 🖉	-		Baseline		Anomaly	0	15	359 deg	29		
Bandwidth-Space-Space Bandwidth-TTC-Gnd		Band 🖉	Vulnerability Hit	0.50	0.82	0.99	EPOCH-Year		All Rec 2008	2008			
Bandwidth-TTC-Space		/A	Vulnerability-Laser	0.60	0.68	0.80	EPOCH-Month	6	2008	6			
Bandwidth-TTC-Space Surveil Min Elev Base Surveillance-RCS		0	Base Kil-Type	0.00	N/A	0.00	EPOCH-Day	1	1	1			
Base Surveillance-RCS			Kil-Dk-Dermanent	0.00	N/A	0.00	EPOCH-Hour	0	0	0			
Surveillance-Mag		0.0 0.0	Kill-Pk-Temporary	0.00	0.00	0.00	EPOCH-Minute	0	0	0			
Z Visibility to RF		0.73 0.95	Kill-Temporary-Time	0	0	0 h	rs EPOCH-Seconds	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
Visibility-RCS		8.3 12.0	dBsm Kill-Power	0	0	0 🗤	/att Large-sized Radar sat	System Des	cription				
Visibility to Optical	0.60	0.71 0.80	Kill-Shots	0	0	0	satellites in orbit and r			bit to detect			
Visibility-OCS	s <u>4.0</u>	6.2 7.0	mag Kill-Time	0	0	0 5	ec						
Rank Indicator-1 6	Large space object is d	etected		0.60	Baseline	0.95	Indicator 1 Probability of D	etection	Comr	nents			
Indicator-2 1	Space object has large			0.60	0.88	0.90	Indicator 2 Probability of D						
Indicator-3 5	Space object is maneuv			0.50	0.71	0.90	Indicator 3 Probability of D						
Indicator-4		itself towards the Earth and		0.50	0.63	0.90 I	۔ Indicator 4 Probability of D			Sincture			
Indicator-5 3	Space object is changin	g attitude		0.60	0.86	0.90 I	Indicator 5 Probability of D	etection 🔲		Antennas			
Indicator-6 4	Space object in sun-syr	nchronous orbit	•	0.60	0.69	0.95 I	Indicator 6 Probability of D	etection		Optics			
Indicator-7 7	SIGINT traffic indicates	military space system		0.10	0.28	0.80 I	Indicator 7 Probability of D	etection	omude 2044	Solar Panels			
Indicator-8 0			•	0.00	0.00	0.00	Indicator 8 Probability of D	etection	FO				
Indicator-9 0			-	0.00	0.00	0.00	Indicator 9 Probability of D			Trans Lunar			
Indicator-10 0				0.00	0.00	0.00	Indicator 10 Probability of I	Detection 📃 🕻	EO	🗌 Earth			
Bassards 14 4 92 4 504	A AL AN ARTICLE		ASSIFIED					OBT-1	JSTO-1	COA-1			
Record: 14 4 83 of 584 What is the System name that i			o obscure the true fur	nctionality and missi	ion of the satelli	te (this v							Num Lock 📴 🗉 🖽 🖽 🕍
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Notional Space Systems (21)



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
Notional Space Systems (22)

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- Home create		atabase lools Add-Ins Dace Games Switchboard	Space Games Data	a Development	Scenario Systems For	iminarea				
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	Systems Ter	mplates	Names	Duplicates	5.	5.0% Dn Off	👻 🗛 📭	₽ E <u>x</u> it		
System Public Name	ame UNK Ship ame CA Ship-Based Command-N							alaa T		
		d-North 💽 Category Dormante 🖵 RN Type		Record # Record Date	# 2380 Use te 4/19/2013 2:04:35 PM	PM Pacific-North ▼				
Non-Target Links N/		Sub-Type			e Operation Blue Thunc					
Grid Name Country		CA90F25 💽 BE Base	e SEA SURFACE TRACK	ACK 💽 Icon Model	lel 💽	System Color	E.	SHERE'S	INTEL Msg: Sheet Form Sen Task: Sheet Form INTEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form	
Location	Bas	seline May Pro	Procurement Priority		aseline Max 3.6 7.0		-		Red COA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form	
In Budget System Quantity		HUX	Military Value			10 Is Best	appalante 17	Alling	Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form	
IOC System Age	Age 5 🚽 13		Procurement Cost		582 M \$5,000 M		1000	Photo		
Now		seline		Basel		LconMin		Photo Max		
20 Vr		0.7 48.0 deg	deg Mass			kg SMA 0		0 km		
I LONG I S0 yr Altitude	NG 161.0 210	10.0 230.0 deg	deg SAT-Delta-V km Launcher-Type	0 0 N/A		m/s Eccentricity 0.0000		0.0000 0.0 deg		
Highlight		0 0 km 0,113 41,000 km	km Launcher-Type km Launcher-Time			hrs RAAN 0		0.0 deg		
			Satellite-Time	0.0		hrs ARG 0		0 deg		
Bandwidth-Space-Gnd				Base	eline			0 deg		
Bandwidth-Space-Space Bandwidth-TTC-Gnd				0.60 0.70	20mmunications/110in	om the satellite to the ground EPOCH-Year 0	All Rec 2008	0		
e	1			0.60 0.60	150 0.80	EPOCH-Year 0 EPOCH-Month 0		0		
			Base Kill-Type	N/A		EPOCH-Day 0		0		
Surveil Min Elev		J.O 0.0	Kill-Pk-Permanent	0.00 0.	.00 0.00	EPOCH-Hour 0		0		
Surveillance-Mag		0.0 0.0	Kill-Pk-Temporary	0.00 0.	.00 0.00	EPOCH-Minute 0	0	0		
Visibility to RF	0.00 0. €	.00 0.00	Kill-Temporary-Time	0 0	0 0	hrs EPOCH-Seconds 0.0000	00 0.0000	0.0000		
Visibility-RCS		0.0 0.0 dBs	Jsm Kill-Power	0 0	ن 0	walt Ship-based mobile Command a	and Control Center for	controlling space		
Visibility to Optical		00.0	Kil-Shots	0 0	0	forces. Ship is located in North	nern region of AOR.	,		
Visibility-OCS Rank	0CS 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 mag	g Kil-Time		0 0					
Indicator-1	Large ship is detected		_	0.70 0.88		Indicator 1 Probability of Detection	2 Com	mments		
Indicator-2 2	Ship has large RF system			0.60	95 0.90	Indicator 2 Probability of Detection				
Indicator-3 6	Ship is operating in same lo			0.50 0.7	7 0.90	Indicator 3 Probability of Detection		n Effects		
Indicator-4 3	Ship orienting itself toward Ship is unusually stable	Js space		0.50 0.68	<u>8</u> 0.90	Indicator 4 Probability of Detection		Sincture		
Indicator-5 4 Indicator-6 5		Epower		0.60 0.7	0.90	Indicator 5 Probability of Detection Indicator 6 Probability of Detection	Themal	C Optics		
Indicator-0 5	SIGINT traffic indicates mili				0.85 0.95	Indicator 7 Probability of Detection	🗌 Attitude	Solar Panels		
Indicator-8	1				0.00	Indicator 8 Probability of Detection	on			
Indicator-9 0				0.00 0./	.00 0.00	Indicator 9 Probability of Detection	on MEO	FEO Trans Lunar		
Indicator-10 0			_	0.00 0. r	.00 0.00	Indicator 10 Probability of Detection		Earth		
Bacardt 14 4 97 of 58	84 🕨 🕨 👫 Unfiltered	UNCLASSIF	FIED				OBT-1 JSTO-1	1 <u>COA-1</u>		
What is the full System technica		J Search								Num Lock 📴 🗇 🤀 😃
		Snac	o Svet	toms /	Also Iv	ocludes N	aval	Syster	ms Related to Space	
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Notional Space Systems (23)




Future Notional Space Systems Can Also be Organized by Year Operational

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Notional Space Systems (24)



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Notional Space Systems Spreadsheet

pace Situational Aware	eness Tools 🛛 🌠 Space (Games Switchboard 🛛 🌠 Spa	ace Games Data Development Scenario Systems - Forn	hates									
Туре 🚽		System Name-Formal	System Name	👻 Kill-Type 👻	AOR 🗸	Index 👻	Vulnerability-Hit 👻	Vulnerability-Hit-Min 👻	Checkout-Time-Max 👻	Indicator-6-Prc 🗸	Indicator-6-Prob-M 👻	Indicator-5-Prob-Ma	- Indic
Large Satellite	Communications	Saniyat Miqraf	NV Large GEO COMM Satellite	▼ N/A	GEO	2612	0.92	0.50	336	0.71	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Missile Warning	Saniet es- Siiah	NV Large GEO MSL Warning Satellite	N/A	GEO	2613	0.70	0.50	336	0.80	0.80	0.90	
Large Satellite	Navigation	al Khashab	NV Large GEO NAV Satellite	N/A	GEO	2614	0.91	0.50	336	0.52	0.10	0.90	
Medium Satellite	Navigation	Khalfiyah	NV Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2615	0.55	0.50	336	0.67	0.60	0.80	
Large Satellite	Photo	Tarsin	NV Large LEO Photo Satellite	N/A	LEO	2621	0.52	0.50	336	0.72	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	SIGINT	as Suwayniah	NV Large GEO SIGINT Satellite	N/A	GEO	2622	0.92	0.50	336	0.84	0.80	0.90	
Large Satellite	Weather	az Zahirah	NV Large LEO WX Satellite	N/A	LEO	2623	0.59	0.50	336	0.90	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Weather	Aqilah	NV Large GEO WX Satellite	N/A	GEO	2624	0.85	0.50	336	0.11	0.10	0.90	
Large Satellite	Inspector	el Ghizlan	NV Large LEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	LEO	2625	0.84	0.50	72	0.66	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Inspector	el Ghizlan	NV Large GEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	GEO	2626	0.52	0.50	72	0.70	0.60	0.90	
Space Launch	Missile Launch Site	Ez Zgarir	NV Space Launch Site-South-Fixed	N/A	Korona-KSC-LP	2645	0.78	0.60	0	0.11	0.10	0.90	
Sensor	RF	al Hamar	NV Large Ground Sensor-RF-North	N/A	Korona-North	2661	0.69	0.50	0	0.86	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Radar	Qiddid	NV Large LEO Space Surveillance-Radar Satellite	N/A	LEO	2665	0.90	0.50	336	0.83	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Optical-SSN	Hawwash	NV Large LEO Space Surveillance-Optical Satellite	N/A	LEO	2666	0.52	0.50	336	0.82	0.60	0.90	
Fixed	Command	al Marafiq	NV Large Ground Fixed Command-North	N/A	Korona-North	2667	0.71	0.50	0	0.76	0.60	0.90	
Fixed	TTC	Karmah	NV Large Ground Fixed TTC-South-Fixed	N/A	Korona-KSC-TTC	2668	0.61	0.50	0	0.92	0.60	0.90	
Mobile	TTC	Hawwash	NV Small Ground Mobile TTC-South	N/A	Korona-South-FL	2672	0.56	0.50	0	0.83	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	Laser	Tmed Atua	NV Large Ground Laser ASAT-South	Laser	Korona-South	2683	0.73	0.50	0	0.82	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	RF	Dacar	NV Mobile Ground Jammer-RF-North	Jammer	Korona-North	2688	0.53	0.50	0	0.70	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	Laser	al Khashab	NV Mobile Laser Blinder-North	Blinder	Korona-North	2685	0.77	0.50	0	0.61	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	Missile-Mobile	Tubul	NV Space Launch ASAT Ground Mobile-South	N/A	Korona-South-FL	2746	0.64	0.60	0	0.78	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	Missile-Mobile	Tubul	NV Space Launch ASAT Ground Mobile-North	N/A	Korona-North	2745	0.62	0.60	0	0.70	0.60	0.90	
ASAT	RF	Dacar	NV Mobile Ground Jammer-RF-South	Jammer	Korona-North-FL	2686	0.67	0.50	0	0.70	0.60	0.90	
Facility	Research	ad Darbadah	NV Space Research Facility-North	N/A	Korona-North	2702	0.75	0.60	0	0.00	0.00	0.80	
Large Satellite	Maintenance	Papaokena	NV Large GEO Maintenance Satellite	Ram	GEO	2741	0.96	0.50	72	0.72	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Maintenance	Papaokena	NV Large LEO Maintenance Satellite	Ram	LEO	2742	0.62	0.50	72	0.63	0.60	0.90	
Facility	Research	Bin Qinnad	NV Industrial Research Facility-South	N/A	Korona-South-FL	2735	0.62	0.60	0	0.00	0.00	0.80	
Facility	Research	Shaftah	NV Industrial Research Facility-North	N/A	Korona-North	2736	0.68	0.60	0	0.00	0.00	0.80	
SAM	Missile Launch Site	Edeba	NV SAM Launch Site-North	N/A	Korona-North	2752	0.71	0.60	0	0.17	0.10	0.90	
Large Satellite	Communications	Veronne	CA Large GEO COMM Satellite	N/A	GEO	2324	0.54	0.50	336	0.87	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Missile Warning	Colline	CA Large GEO MSL Warning Satellite	N/A	GEO	2319	0.62	0.50	336	0.85	0.80	0.90	
Large Satellite	Navigation	Lemou	CA Large GEO NAV Satellite	N/A	GEO	2326	0.88	0.50	336	0.38	0.10	0.90	
Vedium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2329	0.74	0.50	336	0.72	0.60	0.80	
Viedium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2328	0.98	0.50	336	0.64	0.60	0.80	
Medium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2320	0.80	0.50	336	0.84	0.60	0.80	
Medium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2332	0.62	0.50	336	0.79	0.60	0.80	
Medium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2330	0.82	0.50	336	0.69	0.60	0.80	
Medium Satellite	Navigation	La Preville	CA Medium MEO NAV Satellite	N/A	MEO	2330	0.68	0.50	336	0.81	0.60	0.80	
Large Satellite	Photo	Darapin	CA Large LEO Photo Satellite	N/A	LEO	2335	0.91	0.50	336	0.86	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	SIGINT	Carpal	CA Large GEO SIGINT Satellite	N/A	GEO	2335	0.56	0.50	336	0.84	0.80	0.90	
Large Satellite	Weather	Tortue	CA Large GEO SIGINT Satellite CA Large LEO WX Satellite	N/A N/A	LEO	2334	0.81	0.50	336	0.04	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Weather	Johanisse	CA Large GEO WX Satellite	N/A N/A	GEO	2333	0.79	0.50	336	0.50	0.00	0.90	
Large Satellite	Inspector	Blain	CA Large GEO WA Satellite CA Large LEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	LEO	2325	0.57	0.50	72	0.50	0.60	0.90	
	Inspector	Blain	CA Large MEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	MEO	2421	0.84	0.50	72	0.78	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite		Blain	CA Large MEO Inspector Satellite CA Large GEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	GEO	2422	0.64	0.50			0.60	0.90	
Micro Satellite	Inspector	Savanne		Ram	LEO	2323		0.50	72 48	0.85	0.60		
	Inspector		CA Micro LEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	MEO	2420	0.85			0.86		0.90	
Micro Satellite	Inspector	Savanne	CA Micro MEO Inspector Satellite			2423	0.91	0.80	48	0.70	0.60	0.90	
Micro Satellite	Inspector	Savanne	CA Micro GEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	GEO		0.91	0.80	48	0.63	0.60	0.90	
Nano Satellite	Inspector	Medaqui	CA Nano MEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	MEO	2424	0.87	0.80	24	0.88	0.60	0.90	
Nano Satellite	Inspector	Medaqui	CA Nano GEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	GEO	2321	0.93	0.80	24	0.89	0.60	0.90	
Nano Satellite	Inspector	Medaqui	CA Nano LEO Inspector Satellite	Ram	LEO	2419	0.80	0.80	24	0.77	0.60	0.90	
Large Satellite	Space Mine	Gelin	CA Large LEO Mine Carrier	Ram	LEO	2345	0.89	0.50	336	0.39	0.10	0.90	
Largo Satollito	Space Mine	Golin	CA Largo GEO Mino Carrier	Dom	GEO.	2344	0.01	0.60	220	0.00	0.40	0.00	

Space Systems Can be Viewed as a Spreadsheet With Characteristics Colored by Value Range

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Selected Notional Space Systems (1)

Home Create External		dd-Ins							
Space Situational Awareness To	ools 🔣 Space Games Switchbo	oard 🏾 🛃 Space Gan	nes Data Development	Scenario Syste	eet Form				
		NCLASSIFIED		Report	SATCAT	Copy New	Delete Find Close		
Scenario Syste	ms			Report	On Off	▶*	👻 🗛 🕸	E <u>x</u> it	
Eull Name Veronne I	.arge GEO COMM Satellite	•	Linked	SSN		and blows			
System Name CA Large				Record # 5	Use 🔽 🔽	Photo			
Short / Formal Name CA_LCS				ord Date 6/16/2008 2		GEO 🚽	<i>.</i>		View
Non-Target Links N/L		Sub-Type Commu		rio Name Operation Blu		Region			INTEL Msg: Sheet Form Sen Task: Sheet Form
Gnd Name Country Califon	Califon 💌	BE # CA90	F01005 🔍 🗉	E # Final CA90F01005		SDR GEO			INTEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form Red COA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form
Location Public Name UNK Large	e Satellite (5) 📃 🗣	Short Name CA_LO	CS_005 💂	Icon Satellite COM	1M-Frien 💌	Cyan 💽			Rad COA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form
✓ In Budget Final Name Veronne L	.arge GEO COMM Satellite 🛛 🛒	SC Reason	📡 State	Change 0 💌	0 💌 Orbi	ital Change			
IOC System Quantity	10 💌	Mission-Final Pr	iority	3.1	1 Is i	Best Icon	Model u.Geocomsat2.nsm		
🔽 Now System Age	14 💌	Large Satellite 룾 🗤	Value	9.8	10 Is	Best	Random		
 ✓ 10 Yr ✓ 20 Yr ✓ IAT 	Random		Cost	\$118 M	\$M	SMA	42,164	km	
	0.0		Mass	5,970	kg	Eccentricity	0.0004		
Highlight Altitude	0.0	deg SAT-De		819	m/s	Inclination	4.2	deg	
Max Range	0	km Launcher-		N/A		RAAN	236	deg	
Bandwidth-Space-Gnd	C-Band	Km Launcher-		23	hrs	ARG	47	deg	
Bandwidth-Space-Space	N/A			215	hrs	Anomaly	197	deg	
Bandwidth-TTC-Gnd	S-Band	Vulnerabilit		0.54		EPOCH-Year	2008		
Bandwidth-TTC-Space	N/A	Vunerability-L	J	0.73		EPOCH-Month	6		
Surveil Min Elev	0	vunterability-bar		N/A		EPOCH-Day	1		
Surveillance-RCS	0.0	Kill-Pk-Perma		0.00		EPOCH-Hour	0		
Surveillance-Mag	0.0	Kill-Pk-Tempo		0.00	_	EPOCH-Minute	0		
Visibility to RF	0.75	Kill-Temporary-	-Time	0	hrs	EPOCH-Seconds	0.0000 System Description		
Visibility-RCS	8.6	dBsm Kill+P	ower	0	watt	Large-sized satellite comm	unications satellite at geostation	ary orbit.	
Visibility to Optical	0.76	Kil-S	Shots	0					
Visibility-OCS Rank	6.7	mag Kill-	-Time	0	sec		Comments		
Indicator-1 7	ace object is detected			0.88	Indi	cator 1 Probability of Detec			
	ject has very large antennas on-boar		•	0.80	Indi	cator 2 Probability of Detec	tion		
	ject is maneuvering very little (station		•	0.75		cator 3 Probability of Detec		cts Structure	
	ject orienting itself towards the Earth		•	0.70		cator 4 Probability of Detec	Bropulsion	-	
	ject is not changing attitude			0.73		cator 5 Probability of Detec	ton Thermal	-	
	ject has large solar arrays ject has large heat radiators			0.87		cator 6 Probability of Detec cator 7 Probability of Detec	i Acoude i	-	
	affic indicates military space system			0.46		cator 9 Probability of Detec			
Indicator-9 0			• •	0.00		cator 9 Probability of Detec		HEO Trans Lunar	
Indicator-10 0				0.00		cator 10 Probability of Dete		Earth	
Provent M. (1 of CE2) N. M. I.		NCLASSIFIED					OBT-1 JSTO-1	COA-1	
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These are the Actual Space Systems & Characteristics Selected After Randomization

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Selected Notional Space Systems (2)

Space Situational Aw	areness Tools 🐺 Space Games Swit	chboard Signature	Space Games Dat ED	a Development Scenario Sys		Copy New [Delete Find Clo	ose
Scenario S	lystems			Report	SATCAT	₩, ▶*		Ŀ E <u>x</u> it
	Pangnol Large GEO Maintenance Satellite	-	[Linked SSN	On Off			
		 Category 	Satellite	Record # 522	Use 🔽 🔽 Use-f	Prioto	1 \	
Short / Formal Name		 Category Type 	Large Satellite			AOR	{ }	
Non-Target Links N/L		Sub-Type	-	Scenario Name Operation I		egion	je na postal na post	
Gnd Name Country		➡ BE #	CA90F08007	BE # Final UNK				
		Short Name		Icon Satellite Su	Syst	tem Color		
In Budget Final Name		SC Reason		➡ State Change 0 ➡				
System Quantity	4	Mission	- Final Priority	7.2	1 Is Best		Model MaintenanceSat	B.nsm 🖵
Now System Age	4	UNK	Value	4.6	10 Is Best	Icon	Random	Contant 💌
10 Yr	Random		Cost	\$194 M	\$M	SMA	42,165	km
20 Yr LAT	0.0	deg	Mass	362	kg	Eccentricity	0.0052	
30 yr LONG	0.0	deg	SAT-Delta-V	6,125	m/s	Indination	4.4	deg
Highlight Altitude	0	km	Launcher-Type	N/A	•	RAAN	258	deg
Max Range	0	km	Launcher-Time	6	hrs	ARG	245	deg
Bandwidth-Space-Gnd	Ku-Band	-	Satellite-Time	71	hrs	Anomaly	268	deg
Bandwidth-Space-Space	Ku-Band		Vulnerability+Hit	0.77		EPOCH-Year	2008	
Bandwidth-TTC-Gnd	X-Band		Inerability-Laser	0.67		POCH-Month	6	
Bandwidth-TTC-Space	X-Band		erability-Jammer	0.66		EPOCH-Day	1	
Surveil Min Elev	0	-	Kill-Type	Ram	-	EPOCH-Hour	0	
Surveillance-RCS	0.0		ill-Pk-Permanent	0.00		POCH-Minute	0	
Surveillance-Mag	0.0		ill-Pk-Temporary	0.00	EPC	DCH-Seconds	0.0000	
Visibility to RF Visibility-RCS	0.55	Kill-	Temporary-Time	0	hrs		System Description	d rofueling
Visibility to Optical	41.2	absr	NII I OIVEI	0	capa	bilities that rendezvous	ellite with spare parts and with a target satellite in (GEO to repair
Visibility to Optical	8.2	mag	Kill-Shots Kill-Time	0	and	refuel it.		
Indicator-1 5	Large space object is detected	mag	Kil-lime	0	Indicator	1 Probability of Detection	Comn	nents
Indicator-2 4	Space object has excess fuel on-board			0.78		2 Probability of Detection		
Indicator -3	Space object is maneuvering a lot			0.66		3 Probability of Detection		Effects
Indicator -4	Space object is conducting RPO's against	high-value spac		0.62		4 Probability of Detection		Structure
Indicator-5	Space object orienting itself towards high			0.85		5 Probability of Detectio	n Propulsion	Antennas
Indicator-6	Space object is changing attitude			0.85	Indicator	6 Probability of Detectio	n 🔽 Attitude	 ✓ Optics ✓ Solar Panels
Indicator-7 7	SIGINT traffic indicates military space sys	stem		0.57	Indicator	7 Probability of Detectio		V Solar Parleis
Indicator-8				0.00	Indicator	8 Probability of Detectio		
Indicator-9				0.00	Indicator	9 Probability of Detectio		Trans Lunar
Indicator-10 0				0.00	Indicator	10 Probability of Detect	ion 🔽 GEO	🦳 Earth
			ED.					
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Other Space Systems Selected

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Wargame Real Space Systems

Current Space Systems Employed in Wargame

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Real Space Systems



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NORAD assigns a catalog number based upon when the object was first observed, whereas the International Designator is al...


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These Are Actual Space Objects in the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Databases

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Real Space Systems Statistics Menu




Real Space Objects can be Statistically Analyzed


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
Real Space Systems Statistics Graph (1)



Real Space Systems Statistics Graph (2)




Real Space Systems Statistics Graph (3)



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Real Military Terrestrial Systems



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
Space Wargame Execution Tools

Helps Run the Space Wargame

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Space Wargame Execution Main Menu



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INTEL Situation Reports

		_				Space Situat	ional Awareness To	ols (SSA-T)		-			_	_ 0 ×
	Home Create External Dat	ta Database Tools Ad	ld-Ins											
»	Space Warning and Assessment To	ools 🔄 Space Situational A	wareness Tools [🛒 Space Gam	es Switchboard	Spac Sheet Form	nent 🛒 Cou	rses Of Action Even	ls						;
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	Index-Access: 25065	Unique-ID: 6717	Record Date: 12/7/2013	7:55:31 AM	Use Always 🚺 Use-Message	Completed	Systems-Red So	enario Name: Operation Blue	e Thunder Scenario N	Name-Sub:			INTEL Msg: Sheet Form INTEL Sum: Sheet Form	Sen Task: Sheet For Real Sys: Sheet For
	Index-Project: 5500	GUID: 6DE99E5F-20B3-40						DA-Category: Tactic		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Va: Joint Counter-Offensiv	e to Restore	Red COA: Sheet Form	Exer Sys: Sheet For
	Side: Red 🖵	WBS: T.6.9.3.2.6.1.9	Changed:				Systems-Gray	COA-Type:	Acti	ivity Type: Attack			Blue COA: Sheet Form	Weapons: Sheet For
					Launch-Maneuver Random	Note			Target	ted System			,	
	BE Number:	NX90F28028	LAT: 28.46	Indicator-1:	Medium-sized missile is detected		1 0.89	BE Number:	CA90F05005	5	LAT:			
	BE Number-Base:	NX90F28	LONG: 278.49	Indicator-2:	Mobile launcher has extensive re	fueling infrastru	2 0.78	BE Number-Base:	CA90F05		LONG:			
	BE Number Final:	UNK	Altitude: 0.00	Indicator-3:	Mobile launcher has medium missi		4 0.54	BE Number-Final:	UNK		Altitude:	0.00		
	Country:	Newmex	SMA:	Indicator-4:	Mobile launcher orienting itself to	wards space	3 0.58	Country:	Califon		SAT-SMA:			
	Country-Final:	UNK	Eccentricity:	Indicator-5:	Missile launches detected		5 0.81	Country-Final:	UNK		SAT-Eccentricity:			
	AOR:	Newmex-South	Indination:	Indicator-6: Indicator-7	Launched missiles have entered of		6 0.78	AOR:	UNK		SAT-Inclination:			
	Kagion:	Ground	RAAN:	Indicator-7:	SIGINT traffic indicates military sp	bace system	7 0.72 0 0.00	Region: Category:	SDR LEO-S Satellite		SAT-RAAN: SAT-ARG:	0.13		
	Type:	ASAT	ARG:	Indicator-8:	NA		0 0.00	Type:	Large Satellit	te		17.43		
	Sub-Type:	Missile-Mobile	EPOCH-Year:	Indicator-10	R NA	_	0 0.00	Sub-Type:	Photo	ie.	SAT-EPOCH-Year:			
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ane	Name-Public: UNK Mobile Mi	issile Launcher (401)	EPOCH Hour:		Attack 5 Against Califonia Darapi CA90F05005) - Newmexia Ouro 1	Large LEO Photo	Satellite (BE	Name-Public:	UNK Large Satellite (444)		SAT-EPOCH-Hour:	0		
n P	Name Final: UNK Mobile Mi	issile Launcher (401)	EPOCH-Minute:		NX90F28028) - Local Personnel A Exhaust	voiding Standing f	Near Rocket	Name-Final:	UNK Large Satellite (444)		SAT-EPOCH-Minute:	0		
gatic	Name-Small:	NX_SAM_S	EPOCH-Seconds:					Name-Small:	CA_LPS_L		SAT-EPOCH-Seconds:	0		
laviç	Name-Small-Numbered:	NX_SAM_S_003	Event Random #: 0.6939					Name-Small-Numbered:	CA_LPS_L_00	02	Random Number:	0.9200		
-		Cours	ses Of Action			Mici	rosoft Project F	arameters	м	lonte Carlo Pa	rameters		J	
	Key Word:		COA-Limitations:				5tart_Date: 4/2	2/2011 6:27:42 PM	@Risk_Function: Durat	tion=RiskPERT([Min	Duration], [Most likely Dura	tion],[Max D		
	Weapon: Mobile Dire	ect Ascent ASAT	COA-Success Criteria Value:				inish_Date: 4/2	2/2011 7:06:28 PM	@Risk_Min:					
	Event-Full: Newmexia Ou	uro Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT (BB	COA-Desired End State:				Duration:	7 days	@Risk_Mean:	Owe		ailah	la Craca Crat	oma
	Event-Succinct-1: Red Mobile Di	irect Ascent ASAT Destroy Attac	COA-Sequel:				1in_Duration:	1 day	@Risk_Max:				le Space Syst	ems
		irect Ascent ASAT is Conducting a					ely_Duration:	7 days	@Risk_Std_Dev		INTEL I	ndicat	tors Reports	
		ound Mobile TEL is Conducting a I		Red Mobile Direct	Ascent ASAT Destroy Attack		ax_Duration:	14 days	@Risk_Variance:				-	
		d Mobile TEL is Conducting a Dest				WBS_P	redecessors:		@Risk_Skewness:					
	COA-Priority:		NAI-Category: NAI-Type:			P	redecessor		@Risk_Unk:	0				
	COA-Priority Reason: COA-Purpose:		NAL-LYPE: NAL-Priority:			WDC	Successors:		Attacker-Description: Mobile	Comme		verating t		
	COA-Likelihood:		=	IMINT			Successors:		Attacker-Comments: Operation			eraung a		
	COA-Concept:		INTEL_Type_2:			Unique ID	_Successors:		Target-Description: Large			hronous		
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Thousands of Example INTEL Messages Can be Selected to set the Tempo of the Wargame

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Random INTEL Situation Reports

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Side: Red 💌	Sent On Off	Changed:		Launch-Maneuver		COA-Type:		vity Type: Increased Military Activities 💽	
BE Number:	NA	LAT:	BE Number:			LAT:	Start_Date		
BE Number-Base:		LONG:	BE Number-Base:			LONG:	Finish_Date	4/22/2011 9:13:51 PM	
BE Number-Final:	NA	Altitude:	BE Number-Final:			Altitude:	Duration	nt 30 days	
Country:	Newmex	SMA:	Country:	G	alifon	SMA:	Min_Duration	n:	
Country-Final:	UNK	Eccentricity:	Country-Final:	G	alifon	Eccentricity:	Most_Likely_Duration	12	
AOR:		Inclination:	AOR:			Inclination:	Max_Duration		
Region:		RAAN:	Region:			RAAN:	Data Source	Paul Szymanski	
Category:		ARG:	Category:			ARG:			
Type:		Anomaly:	Туре:			Anomaly:	Attacker-De:	Randomly Generated Space	e Systems
Sub-Type:		EPOCH-Year:	Sub-Type:			EPOCH-Year:	Attacker-Cc	· · ·	•
Mission-Final:		EPOCH-Month:	Mission-Final:			EPOCH-Month:	Taro de	INTEL Indicators Rep	orts
Name-Full:		EPOCH-Day:	Name-Full:			EPOCH-Day:	Target-Co		
Name-Public:		EPOCH-Hour:	Name-Public:			EPOCH-Hour:	Comments	51	
Name-Final:		EPOCH-Minute:	Name-Final:			EPOCH-Minute:			
Name-Small:		EPOCH-Seconds:	Name-Small:			EPOCH-Seconds:			
Small-Numbered:		Event Random #:	Name-Small-Numbered:			Ratuom Number:			
Courses Of	Action	FM: SATAC					INTEL Message	INTEL Msg: Sheet Form Sen Task: Sheet Form INTEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form	
Key Word:		TO: USAF AFMC AFRL/RDTE INFO: USAF AFMC AFRL/RIE	A					INTEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form Red COA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form	
	ct Ascent ASAT	UNCLASS //						Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form	
	uro Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT G	SWAT T.6.9.3.1.1.11 / IN	ς; // ΈΚΕΡ / SATAC / 2275943ΖΑρr	u //					
	irect Ascent ASAT Garrison / Sto	IMINT / FM 2218	2742ZApr11 TO 22211351ZA		nce //				
	irect Ascent ASAT Garrison / Sto		7	/ BEN: NA	/ CTY: UNK	/ MSN:	11		
1	irect Ascent ASAT Garrison / Sto	AOR:	'LOC:	11					
	Ascent ASAT Garrison / Storage		/ SMA: / EC ARG: / ANO		7 INC: 77	11			
INTEL_Type_1: IMINT		UNITID/TGT:		7 BEN:	/ CTY: Califon	1 / MSN:	11		
INTEL_Type_2: COMINT		EPOCH:		// ECC:	7 INC:	11			
			ARG: / ANC		// mand Contors Built / Act	ivated that are has been Associated wi	th Sites //		
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
INTEL Tasking Development Tool

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»	Space Situational Awareness Tools E PS-Form-SIPB-5-6 Space Games Switchboa		wended PIR's, EEI's and RFI's	×
	Messa.	ges GBOSS Report		
	1.6.1 Recommended	▶ ₩ ₩ Exit		
	PIR's / EEI's / RFI's 🔤			
	PIR Requirements PIR Coverage Zones PIR Data Formats PIR Requesting Organization PIR Sup	porting Organization PIR Info Organization		
	Exercise or Opertional?:		View	
	Record Number: 96 Side: Red Scenario Name:	Operation Blue Thunder	INTEL Msg: Sheet Form Sen Task: Sheet Form	
	PIR Number: 3.1.2.10 STO Name: Record Date: 1/8/2007 3:28:53 PM Analysis Name:	STO-1	INTEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form Red COA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form	
		1/20/2010 2:25:48 PM Send Sent	Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form	
	PIR Category: Space Target-Type: S	Satellite-Unmanned		
	PIR Type: Tactical PIR 🗨 Target-Name: I	INMARSAT 3-F4		
	PIR Name: Status - Manash Space-Based Nano GEO N SATCAT Number: 2			
		OR Nano GEO Mine-Jamme		
		MSO 🔍		
Pane	INTEL Collection Type 1: IMINT - Visible Collection Start Time:	5/11/2010 8:00:00 AM 👤 Now		
tion	INTEL Collection Type 2: IMINT - IR Collection End Time:	5/11/2010 11:00:00 PM 💽 Now		
vigat	INTEL Collection Type 3: IMINT - MSI	13:52 Now		
Na	INTEL Collection Type 4: SIGINT - ELINT - TELINT Collection LTIOV:	5/12/2010 8:00:00 AM 💽 Now		
	INTEL Collection Type 5: MASINT - LASINT	5/11/2010 12:00:00 PM 💌 Now		
		Other Phase: (Fill In Below)		
		Dat Phase Post-Conflict Phase urly Monthly		
	General Comments	DR90F09012) to determine probable military		
	mission capabilities			
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	Warg	ame Users Ca	n Setup INTEL Request Messages	
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Unknown Space Object Automatic Mission Assessment Tool



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
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Space Object State Change Automatic Detection Tool

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Index (Use 1	nterest	: Ignore	Data Date	Mission	SAT No	Space Object Name	Characteristic	Sort Mission-Now Correlation	Sort Mission-All Correlation	Sort Self Correlation	Sort Overall Score		Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form Ignore-Interest Reason
12219148				18-Jun-13	COMM-CIVIL - LEO - Active	27834		1st Mean	9.92		0.10	3.7	Radically c	changing altitude starting on 4-18-13.
12225422				18-Jun-13	OPTICAL - LEO-S - Active	36599		BStar	9.72	0.01	0.01	1.3		
11822855				01-Apr-13	COMM-CIVIL - LEO - Active	38047 38256		1st Mean 1st Mean	9.40 9.24		0.03	0.5		.
11439064				15-Apr-13 01-Feb-13	OPTICAL - LEO - Active		KANOPUS-V 1	Ist Mean BStar	8.99	0.09	0.01	1.3 1.2		
10254795				01-Feb-13	OPTICAL - LEO - ACtive		OCEANSAT 2	1st Mean	8.99	0.05	0.01	2.3		
10664552	- -			14-Sep-12	COMM-CIVIL - GEO-G-B - Active	26745		Eccentricity	8.95		0.02	0.5		
11778940				01-Apr-13	COMM-CIVIL - MEO - Active	26857		Mean Motion	8.93		0.05	1.1		Ranked List of Those Space Objects
11050203				15-Nov-12			YAOGAN 9A	Eccentricity	8.93	4.95	0.05	1.0		That Have Changed the Most, Or
12225209				18-Jun-13	COMM-CIVIL - LEO-S - Active	29712	Pehuensat 1	1st Mean	8.88		0.03	1.2		e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
12229438				18-Jun-13	TECHNOLOGY - LEO-S - Active	28060	SERVIS 1	Mass	8.88	5.43	0.00	0.7		Otherwise Appear Out of the
11733497				13-Mar-13	EARTH IMAGING - LEO-S - Active	38011	SSOT	BStar	8.86	0.02	0.04	1.0		Ordinary, Since the Last Calculation
10594859	Г			03-Sep-12	OPTICAL - LEO - Active	37728	ORS 1 (USA 231)	1st Mean	8.85		0.04	1.8		
10636552				14-Sep-12	METSAT - LEO-S - Active	29108	CALIPSO	1st Mean	8.82		0.01	1.3		
11787562				01-Apr-13	COMM-CIVIL - MEO - Active	27707	MOLNIYA 1-92	1st Mean	8.73		0.09	2.3		
11431187		Γ		01-Feb-13	NAVSAT - MEO - Active	37846	GALILEO-PFM	RCS	8.72	8.65	0.06	0.6		The Higher the Correlation Score, the
10917704				01-Nov-12	COMM-CIVIL - LEO - Active	37193	GLOBALSTAR M073	BStar	8.67	0.02	0.01	0.7		
12080342	Γ	Γ		15-May-13	EARTH IMAGING - LEO - Active	36985	TIANHUI 1	BStar	8.64	0.30	0.00	1.5		More the Space Object Has Changed,
10287297				02-Jul-12	TECHNOLOGY - LEO-S - Active	35934	UWE-2	BStar	8.62	0.47	0.00	1.0		Or Lacks Similarity to Other Objects
11823736				01-Apr-13	ELINT - LEO - Active	36414	YAOGAN 9B	Eccentricity	8.53	7.81	0.05	1.3		of Its Mission Class
10408507				27-Jul-12	NAVSAT - MEO - Active	37847		RCS	8.51	8.27	0.05	0.3		
10632651				14-Sep-12	NAVSAT - GEO - Active	34779		Eccentricity	8.51 🤶	9.00	0.03	0.7		
10582788				03-Sep-12	COMM-CIVIL - GEO - Active	26824		Height	8.49		0.00	0.4		
11770679				01-Apr-13	TECHNOLOGY - LEO-S - Active		DELFI C3	1st Mean	8.45		0.03	1.2		
11884686	Γ			15-Apr-13	COMM-CIVIL - GEO-G-A - Active		SIRIUS FM-5	RAN	8.45	5.24	0.03	1.1		
11911387				01-May-13	SCIENCE - LEO-S - Active	27424		Mass	8.42		0.00	1.5		
11997592				15-May-13	SCIENCE - LEO-S - Active	27424		Mass	8.42		0.00	1.5		
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This SSA-T Tool Automatically Detects Maneuvering or Changing Space Objects

Space Object State Change Automatic Detection Tool Statistics Graphs



Details of Maneuvering or Changing Space Objects Can be Assessed

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Countries With the Most Changes to Their Space Objects

🛒 Space Situational Awareness Tools 🛛 🛒 Space Games Switchboard 🖉 Sp	Dead Space Object Status Changes by Country	a large is justi		
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED Dead Space Object Status Changes - By Country -	Averages Orbital Graphs Summary	Find Close 1 A Exit	
Country Store Taiwan 42 Russia 3.7 France 3.0 Sweden 3.0	Country Average Score Russia 3.1 Japan 2.9 China 2.9	View - X NITEL Msg: Sheet Form Sen Task: Sheet Form NITEL Sum: Sheet Form Real Sys: Sheet Form Red (CDA: Sheet Form Exer Sys: Sheet Form		
India 2.4 ITSO 2.1	France 2.5 Sea Launch 2.3	Blue COA: Sheet Form Weapons: Sheet Form		
			Whose Space (Highest State Cl May Mean They Space War Prior 1	r Those Countries Objects Have the hange Scores. This Are Setting Up for to Initiating Conflict Earth
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Example Wargame Intelligence Warning Messages



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
Space Courses Of Action (COA's) Tools

Helps Develop Space War Plans

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Red Space COA's Automatic Estimation



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Blue Space Courses Of Action

-	Actior		ourse Of opment	Messag fects Request	es Si	COA tuation	s Support	. •	•	M		E <u>x</u> it			
		ord Number:	129	Side:	Red	1		io Name:			n Blue Thunder		-		View
		fect Number:		E-1				O Name:			STO-1				INTEL Msq
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		Effect Type:	Diplomatic Pressure	2	-	1	Targe	et-Name:	Drari Salem !	Space Ma	anufacturing Fac	ility-South			
	E	Effect Name:	Pressure Orgonia t	o cease space	weapons 👻		SATCAT	Number:					-		
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	Effect	Description:	Try convinving Org	jonia to stop o	r reduce spac	e weapons	increased	l productio	n rates to pr	event ar	ms buildup in reg	gion 💽	-		
	Supported COA:		Hidden Disrupt		-		COA	Number:	4.4.15.10				-		
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ane		COA Type:	OCS-Deceive			со	A Priority	Reason:	Critical to pr	eventing	strategic surpri	se	-		
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igat			Eff	ect Method		Categ	ory	Effe	ect Start Time		Effect Er	nd Time			
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SSA-T Tools can Assist the User in Developing Space Courses Of Action (COA's)

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Weapon Tasking Messages

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n Tasking Messages	Setup Final View Tasking Tasking	Send Selected Tasking Tasking	Copy New Di □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□	lete Find Close	it	
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The Wargame User can Setup Blue Space Weapon Tasking Messages

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Space Weaponeering

The Wargame User can Develop Detailed Optimized Space Weapons Plans

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Weapon Assignments

Home C	Treate External Data Datab	pase Tools Add-Ins											
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Mission-Final	UNK	Chaser Range	0	Vulnerability-Hit:	0.82 Exercise Delta-V:	863							
Chaser Value	3.9	Chaser Cost:	\$406 M	Vulnerability-Laser:	0.66 Exercise Delta-V Left:	863							
Navigation SSN-Target BE Number	End Game	e Visibility Time Constraint:	10	Min Vulnerability-Jammer:	0.62	Target							
	27426	▼ Target Name-Full DIF	RECTV 5 (TEMPO 1)	Vulnerability-Hit:	0.83 Mass	2,938							
BE Number	CA90F06003	▼ Target Name-Final UN	IK Micro Satellite (187)	Vulnerability-Laser:	0.78 Lifetime	7							
BE Number-Final	UNK	Target Status	Active	Vulnerability-Jammer:	0.73 Life Left	44%							
Target Country	Orgonia	Target Altitude	35,792		Orbital Change	0.0%	🗖 🚽 🔤 🖊 🗖	ked Satellite ("Target")					
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	satellite number, UNK Name and Number, or Basic Encyclopedia (BE) number for the attacking space object that will maneuver												
			This is	s the Spa	ce Weapons	s Assignr	nent Screen						
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Optimized Space Weapon Courses Of Action (1)

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Optimized Space Weapon Courses Of Action (2)


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Mission-Final	UNK	Chaser Range	0	Vulnerability-Hit:	Exercise Delta-V:	Scenario Short Name: ODB-1	Closest End Time: 2.0 Min	Data-Red: 5% Min Data-Blue: 20% Max	
Chaser Value	3.9	Chaser Cost:	\$406 M	Vulnerability-Laser: 0.6	i6 Exercise Delta-V Left:	JSTO Name: Rolling Disrupt	Cost Ratio: 1.0 Max	Data-Grave 5% Min	
Lane		Game Chaser Visibility:	43%	Min Vulnerability-Jammer: 0.6	2	JSTO Short Name: STO-1	Value Ratio: 1.0 Max	Rensor Red: 15% Min	
SSN-Target	27426	Target Name-Full DIRE	CTV 5 (TEMPO 1)	Vulnerability-Hit:	33 Mass	Tactic Name: Tactic-1 Tactic Short Name: TAC-1	Delta-V: 1.0 Min Transit Time: 24.0 Min	Sensor-Blue: 20% Max	
BE Number	CA90F06003	Target Name-Final UNK		Vulnerability-Laser: 0.7		Comments: Baseline test case.		Sensor-Gray: 15% Min	
BE Number-Final	UNK	Target Status	Active	Vulnerability-Jammer: 0.1	73 Life Left		All	TTC-All: 20% Min	
Target Country	Orgonia	Target Altitude	35,792		Orbital Change	Cost Ratio: 0.7	Value Ratio: 0.9	Data-All: 10% Min	
Country-Final	Orgonia	Target Inclination	0.2		State Change	Sum of Chaser Costs: \$16,331		Sensor-All: 20% Min	
Target Region	SDR GEO	Target Eccentricity	0.0056		State Change Reason	Sum of Target Costs: \$11,329	\$M Sum of Target Values: 161	All Data-TTC-Sensor: 20% Min	
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Mission-Final	UNK	Target Cost:	\$10 M			Record: 14 🔸 1 of 1 🕨 🕨 👫 N			
Target Value	3.9	Target Visibility:	3%			Results			
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Start Time-Burn 2:	11/2/2012 4:12:19 PM	Delta-V-Burn 2:	2.30	K/s Transit Time:	19.1 Hrs. Maneuver Type	: In-Plane			
Start Time-Burn 3:	11/2/2012 9:38:17 PM	Delta-V-Burn 3:	1.41	K/s Start Time Difference:	52.2 Hrs. Error	5:			
Start Time-Burn 4:	11/3/2012 9:42:23 AM	Delta-V-Burn 4:	-0.01	K/s End Time Difference:	-0.7 Hrs. Results Commen	s Min Delta-V			
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Space Weapons can be Optimized to Avoid Adversary Sensor Networks

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Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (1)



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Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (2)


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Space Weapons Attacks can be Optimized for Ratio of Target vs Expended Weapon Costs

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
Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (3)



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
Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (4)



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
Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (5)



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
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
Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (7)



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Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (8)



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
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Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (10)



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Space Weapon Courses Of Action Optimization Statistics (11)



Space Courses Of Action Refinements

Additional Tools to Achieve Optimized Space COA's

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Possible Space Strategies

10 N) =			Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)			
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Title	Strategy	Desired End State	Comments			
Funnel COMM	Selectively disrupt select Red space systems communications assets so that critical Red sensor and C4 info gets directed to	Delay receipt of critical info while conserving space control weapons employment.				
	communications paths with low data rates, effectively delaying receipt of critical data beyond its useful life.					
Herd COMM	Selectively destroy or temporarily disrupt specific Red space systems communications assets so that critical Red sensor and	Make Red more vulnerable to intelligence exploitation.				
	C4 info gets directed to known paths that can be monitored by Blue sensors.	4 7	4			
		4				
Herd Sensors	Temporarily deny Red space sensors, or only certain sensors. This will blind them, until they are allowed to use them again	Control Red perception of Blue strengths and battlefield situation.		244 T	and the second	
	when Blue side wants them to observe certain fake Blue force dispositions. This directs Red sensors to see only what Blue		4	and the second sec	and the second	and the second second
						and the second second second
Herd Space Personnel	lightly damage one ground center. Assume that key space	📕 technically trained space personnel. Also sends 🛛 📕	4			
	support personnel will converge to this lightly damaged site to conduct repairs. 12 hours later, use anti-personnel weapons at	message to international community that foreign personnel supporting Red space efforts will be at risk.		and the second sec		and the second
Hidden Disrupt	Employ weapons with low probability of detection and attribution, to minimize world reaction to Blue side counter	Red side loses confidence in his space systems. He is constantly kept off-balance by repeated disruption of his				
	space. Temporarily disrupt spacecraft operations at random times.	space capabilities That are timed within his decision cycle times. Political implications of space control need				
Hidden Negate	Employ weapons with low probability of detection and	Red probably hasn't used space systems in a real				and the second s
Milluen niegale	attribution, to minimize Red perception that Blue has begun counter space operations. Slowly increase tempo of Red	conflict before, and their decreasing reliability under combat stress might be understandable and acceptable	A			
-	satellite disruption, starting with minor anomalies easily	compatistress might be understandable and acceptable to them.				
Periodic Degrade	Use degrade type of weapons whose attack cycles are timed to	As Red starts to bring on-line an alternate space			A CONTRACT OF	
	correspond with the reconstitution or replacement time of that target's capability.	capability, it is negated. This minimizes space weapons employment, but does not have as much shock value as	-	Constant of the local division of the local		
	angers cupuonty.	a Sweep The Skies attack.		The second se		
Rolling Disrupt	Temporarily disrupt Gray space assets for small lengths of time,	Keep Gray side guessing as to the ultimate fate of their				
1943	then move on to other Gray assets. Use low probability of detection and attribution weapons. This will give the impression	space systems if they continue to support Red side.				
	of reliability issues with Gray equipment, not intentional attack,	/				
Sweep The Ground	Destroy all prime Red space-related ground targets with a	With all ground sites destroyed, satellites cannot be				
	minimum of collateral damage.	tasked or download data. Probably a more politically acceptable solution, but space-related ground sites can				
		be replaced easier than satellites after the war, and data			and the second	
Sweep The Skies	Destroy all Red satellites whether military, civil, or commercial, in a synchronized simultaneous attack so that Red	One large synchronized blow keeps red off balance.				
	protective/reconstitution measures cannot be implemented in	4				
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Some Unique Space Strategies

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Space Principles of War Assessment

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of V		loady defined desiring and attainable	
	Direct every military operation toward a cle objecti		
Principle of V		Percente Comments	
Objective	Have you considered whether your objectives are to take out a sate capability that may be supported by both satellites and ground syste	lellie only, or a total system ems (integrated targeting)	
Objective	▼ Will taking out the space system be decisive in denying that catego	ory of information	
Objective	Does the attack have a measurable impact on the battlefield		
Objective	📰 💻 🗕	ttacked sunnots	
Objective			
Objective	s satisfaction of this objective achievable	×	
Objective	✓ ☐ Are there branches and sequels to space control operations plans if	if they fail or if they are successful	
Offensive	Is there political will to start a space war at the beginning of conflict	t and seize the space initiative, or is	
Offensive	Are we setting the time, place and terms of the space battle		
Oliciisive	 Resource and terms of the space back 		
Offensive	Does the battle tempo include space attacks on a continuing basis	s to keep the adversary off-balance	
Offensive	▼ Can space weapons sustain continuous attacks		
Offensive	✓ ■ Is there a pre-approved ramp-up of space attack severity to exploit :	t successes for further gain	
Mass	Are there sufficient weapons to achieve continuous, or sustained sp		
WILSS			
Mass	Have you considered that the adversary can re-configure to avoid a	altack	
Mass	✓ ✓ ✓ Are the weapons employed overwhelming to the military function the	rey are trying to deny	
Mass	Is there political will to implement massed space attack		
Mass	Can space weapons get into position at the decisive place and time		
Mass			
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Space Courses Of Action Rules of Engagement


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Each Space COA Must Follow Commander's Intent & Legal Rules of Engagement

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Ranked Space Weapon Types



Some Weapon Types are More Escalatory to the Conflict than Others

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Space Strategies-to-Task Hierarchy


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				Optimize COA Space Strategies						
	Objective Type/#	Objective	Purpose	Concept	Goals	Limitations	Data Source			
	National Goal 🔍 💌	Maintain the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the U.S. with					Szymanski			
	National Security Objective 🖵 NS.1	Protect the U.S., its people, and its territory								
	National Military Objective 戻	Deter or defeat military attacks against U.S. allies, friends, and interests					RAND Strategies to Task			
	Conflict Level	Major Theater War					RAND Strategies to Task	- 1		
								In a		
	Campaign Phase 💌	Space Superiority					RAND Strategies to Task	1 States -		
	Campaign Objective 룾	Suppress national capacity to wage war					RAND Strategies to Task			
tion Pane	Operational Objective 💌 5.5.	Damage/destroy national communications infrastructure				None	Derived from: Space Control Mission Area Plan FY 04 and Beyond, 18 January 2002	A CONTRACT		
Naviga	Operational Task 📿 4.4.	Determine Attitude of Space Object				None	Derived from: Space Control Mission Area Plan FY 04 and Beyond, 18 January 2002			
	Operational Sub-Task	Intermittently Jam Command Signals of Resident Space Object				Do not approach target satellite closer than 10 meters	Derived from: Space Control Mission Area Plan FY 04 and Beyond,			
	Success Criteria 🖃 2.3.2.1.	Adversary denied satellite COMM over AOR	Prevent adversary from determining coming coalition attack	Increase time and resources required for adversary to gather information on coalition		Do not damage adversary satellite	= Szymanski	overy		
	Success Indicator	Less than 10% remaining traffic on satellite COMM over AOR	Prevent adversary from determining coming coalition attack	Increase time and resources required for adversary to gather information on coalition		Target satellite has no apparent irreversible damage	Szymanski			
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Another COA Development Methodology is to Use RAND Strategies-to-Task Hierarchies

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Space Mission Objectives Optimization Rankings



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Space Weapon Orbital Engagement (Target Parameters)



Specific Physics Parameters of Space Attacks for the Targeted Space Object

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Space Weapon Orbital Engagement (Weapon Parameters)

				Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
		Database Tools Add-Ins			0
>>	Space Warning and Assessment Tools		ilitary Requirements 🛛 🌠 Courses of Action 🛛 🌉 Op Scenario Name	Dptimize Course of Action Execute Space Mission Engagement Scenarios	×
	Chaser Engagement	t Scenarios Update	Prime V Normal Value Prime V Normal Value Record Date 11/6/2003 10:21:19 PM		
		Object Catalog # 10967 💌	Model Name DMSP 💌		
	Start Times		Calculate Desired Thrust Object Thrusting	Overall Comments	
	Year 2003 룾	LVLH Current:X +00012.00	LVLH Desired Velocity× 1.6937E-18		
	Month 11 룾	LVLH Current-Y +00000.00	LVLH Desired Velocity-Y 1.2978E+13		
	Day 6 🖵	LVLH Current-Z +00000.00	LVLH Desired Velocity-Z 2.0967E-03	▼	
	Hour 22 💌 Minute 21 💌	LVLH DesiredX +00020.00	Body Fixed Thrust-X +000.0000		
	Minute 21 💌 Second 19.0000000 🖵	LVLH Desired-Z +00000.00	Body Fixed Thrust-Y +000.0000 ↓ Body Fixed Thrust-Z +000.0000 ↓		
	Euler Angles		Starting Mass	Current Mass	
	Euler Angle Sequence-1 3	ECI Radius-I +006633.9833 룾	Max Dry Mass +002000.00 룾	Current Payload Mass +000150.00	
	Euler Angle Sequence-2 2 룾	ECI RadiusJ +000475.8245 룾	Max Payload Mass +000150.00 룾	Current Main Ox Mass +000700.00	
e	Euler Angle Sequence-3 1	ECI Radius-K +002601.4136 🖵	Max Main 0x Mass +001500.00	Connerd Main Firel Mars +000690.00	
n Par	Euler Angle-Frame 1	EEI Velocity Vector I -0002.3908	Ma-Man Ded Mars +001500.00	Cured RCS Finnes Her +00082.00	
latio	Evlet Angle 1 +180.00	ECI Velocity Vector J -0002.6583	Max RCS Primar Mass +000105.00	Current RCS Vernier Mass +000020.00	
lavig	Euler Angle-2 +000.00	EUl Velocity Vector K +0006.5617	Max 8CS Vernier Mass +000025.00		
		200			
	Angular Velocities	Body Moments & Torques Moment of Inertia +02200.5	Runge Kutta Integrator	Other Parameters	
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
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Optimization Tools

SSA-T Tools to Help Optimize & Manage Space Sensor Tasking

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SSA Optimization Main Menu Screen



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
Page 98 of 211 Pages

SSA Requirements Matrix

				Space Situational Awar	eness Tools (SSA-T)			
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>>	Space Warning and Assessment T	ools 🛛 😰 Space Situational Awareness Tools 🖉 Milit						×
»	SSA Requiremen Record Number: 1684 Record Sequence: 172 Requirement #: 3.3.1.1.1.9.1. Tracking #: Record Date: 1/15/2007.2 Data Source: Paul Szyme Source Category: SWAT-3S; Level 1: Evaluate the Adversary Level 2: (3) Determine the co Level 3: Composition Level 4: Ceneric sate	UNCLASSIFIED Update Data Updat	All Off JSpOC On Current Or All On SWAT On Compiled O Other On Range V Vse Requirement Other On Range V Use Requirement Other On Range V Use Requirement Compiled Requirement Satellity T2:52:00 PM Compiled Tota V How Exploit: V INTEL System:	b Excel-All Excel-1 b Excel-Select Excel-2 t Priority: • • • Weight 1: 5 • • • Weight 2: • • • sl Weight 12.5% • • sl Weight 12.5% • • sl Weight 2: • • • sl Weight 3: • • • sl Weight 3: • • • • sl Weight 3: • • • • • • • • sl Weight 3: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	V-1 Statistics Copy V-2 Image: Copy Image: Copy 3 SpOC Requirement Image: Copy 3 SpOC Requirement Image: Copy Other Requirement Image: Copy Other Requirement Image: Copy Terrestrial Sensors Image: Copy 1 2 3 4 5 Image: Copy Statellite Name ARTEMIS ARTEMIS Image: Copy ellite Face to Observe: Image: Copy ellite Face to Observe: Image: Copy	COMM-TEST - Active Primary Seconda ct Face to Observe Required Data Y-Face Z-Face	sion Score 0.0%	
		Solar panel power		Coordinates Definition		• 0 • 0.5 •	Space Sense	or Requirements
ane	🗹 Level 9	Solar panels beginning of life power		Deminition			Ranked	& Optimized
on F	🗌 Level	10:			Actual S X-Face	ipace Object Face Observed Y-Face Z-Face		printer
rigati	Desired End Effect:		[Face Score 0.0%	Plus:			
Navi	Red Military Significance:]		Minus:			
	Blue Military Significance: Data Utility:			Recommended Min	imal Required Lighting:	Illumi	plar ination inition	
	Broad INTEL Requirement:			• •	riccuit Lighting			
	Detailed INTEL Requirements:	Satellite Solar Panels Beginning Of Life (BOL) Total Power]	T	eviously Known Data	Currently Discove		
		Exquisite Characterization	[Previously Known:	Value: 💽 🗸 C	urrently Known: Value:	•	
	INTEL Indicators:			Data Source:		Data Source:		
	Success Criteria: NIIRS Definition Space NIIRS:	8		▼ Data Quality:		Data Quality:		
	Resolution Requirements:		ıx: 💌 Calc Range: 💌	Data Confidence:		Data Confidence:		
	Required Technology:	Optical Spectrometer Optical:	RF: Min: V Max: V					
	Main Detection Means:	Imagery Secondary Det		▼ P1	Intelligence C P2 P3 P4 P	ollection Procedures 5 P6 P7 P8 P	¹⁹ P10	
	Responsibility:			Requirement:				
		Would have to detect type of solar cells, overall solar panel s	ize, and degree of degradation. Lighting Quality of Me(
	Secondary Comments:			▼ Success: ▼				
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		Delineates Sp	ace Situation	al Awaro	eness (SS	SA) Requi	rements Deta	<mark>ails -</mark>

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
SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (1)




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SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (2)




SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (3)



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
SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (4)



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SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (5a)



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SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (5b)



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SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (6)

9		Create External Data Database arning and Assessment Tools Signa Space UNCLASSIFIED		ny Requirements		tional Awareness Tools (SSA-T) cking 💦 💽 SSA Requirements Summary 🏾 💽 SSA Requ	uirements Tracking Graphs 📱 Required Observation Resolution	(_ 6 ×
	Requ	ired Observation F	Resolution	NIIRS	Definition	Export to Excel		
	180		ired Observation Re	solution		Space NIIRS	UNCLASSIFIED Copy New Delete Find Close Report A ++ M A M A E Xit	
	160 140				<u>158</u>		Report 🗮 🕨 <table-cell> Mi Exit</table-cell>	
ation Pane	Number of Requirements 80			99		Terrestrial Examples: Identify the wing configuent of the environmental domes at	yuration of small fighter aircraft (e.g., F- 16). Detect large (e.g., greater than 10 meter diameter) t an electronics facility.	
Navig	5 80 Numper 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80	3	39			Space Examples: Detect if large (e.g., TDI	DRS) solar panel has deployed.	
	20	17 13	13					
			4 5 6 Space NiiRS Quality	7 8 9 Figure	N/A	Record: H 🛛 S of 10 🕨 H 🗷 🕅 No Filter	UNCLASSIFIED JSTO-1 COA-1	
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SSA Sensor Optimization Graphs (7)



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SSA Sensor Collection Strategy

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		Create External I										(
»	Space War	rning and Assessment	ssessment Tools Space Situational Awareness Tools Military Requirements Space Situational Assessment Requirements Tracking Space									· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	INTEL Collection Recommendations								Find a a	Close		
					Export to Excel			Report	port 👬 💵 E <u>x</u> it			
	SSN #: 28924 Satellite Name: AMC-23 Operational Mission: COMM-CTVIL - Active											
		Requirement #	Requirement	INTEL Collection System		Terrestrial	Space	Resolution	NIIRS	Lighting	Face	
	10.0%		Attitude	System-4	Imagery or RADAR			1.2 - 2.5	4	High	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.14.3.1	Appendages movement	System-4	Optical Imagery			0.20 - 0.40		High	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.14.3.2	Appendages movement	System-4	RADAR Imagery			0.20 - 0.40		N/A	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.16.1.5		System-4	Imagery			0.10 - 0.20	8	High	Minus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.19.1.4 3.3.1.1.1.22.1.1	Solar panel pointing direction	System-4	Imagery			0.20 - 0.40	9	High	Plus X or Minus X	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.1 3.3.1.1.1.22.1.2.2	Optical sensor aperture size Sensors : Optical : Cut-on Waveband Number	System-4	Imagery			<0.10		High	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.2.2		System-4	RF Signal Monitoring		<u> </u>	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	Plus Z Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3	Sensors : Opucal : Cut-off Waveband Number	System-4 System-4	RF Signal Monitoring			N/A <0.10	9	Low	Plus Z	
			Sensors : Optical : Detector Type		Imagery			<u> </u>				
е	10.0%		Sensors : Optical : Detector Type Sensors : Optical : Microlenslets	System-4	RF Signal Monitoring			N/A <0.10	N/A 9	N/A	Plus Z Plus Z	
n Pa		3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.2		System-4	Imagery			<u> </u>	9	Low		
Navigatio	10.0%		sensors : Optical : FOV nair angle Sensors : Optical : IFOV	System-4	Imagery			<0.10	9		Plus Z	
	10.0%		Sensors : Optical : IFOV Sensors : Optical : Focal Length	System-4	Imagery		V	<0.10	9	Low	Plus Z Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.5		System-4 System-4	Imagery Imagery			<0.10	9	Low	Plus Z	
	10.0 %	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.7		System-4	Imagery			<0.10	9	Low	Plus Z	
	10.0 %	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.7		System-4	Imagery			<0.10	9	Low	Plus Z	Space Sensor Requirements
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.10		System-4	Imagery			0.10 - 0.20	2	High	Plus Z	Ranked & Optimized
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.3.10	Optical sensors articulating abilities	System-4	Imagery			<0.10	° I o	High	Plus Z	·
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.1.4	Optical sensors ar uculating abilities Optical sensor covers and shutters	System-4	Imagery			<0.10	,	High	Plus Z	
	10.0 %	3.3.1.1.1.22.2	Optical sensor normal pointing direction	System-4	Imagery		_ <u>.</u>	20.10		High	1103.2	
	10.0 %	3.3.1.1.1.22.2	Sensors : RF : RF antenna size	System-4	Imagery		V	0.20 - 0.40	7	High	Plus Z	
	10.0 %	3.3.1.1.1.22.2.2	Sensors : RF : RF frequency bands	System-4	Imagery		V	0.20 - 0.40	7	High	Plus Z	
	10.0%		Sensors : RF : RF frequency bands	System-4	RF Signal Monitoring			N/A	N/A	N/A	Plus Z	
	10.0 %		Sensors : RF : RF FOV	System-4	Imagery			0.10 - 0.20	8	High	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.2.6.2		System-4	Imagery			0.10 - 0.20	8	High	Plus Z	
	10.0%	3.3.1.1.1.22.3	Proximity Detectors Present	System-4	, andger (5125 5120		·	Plus Z	
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Number denotes the overall value of fulfilling this intelligence requirement. The higher the percentage, the better.												

Top SSA Requirements for This Conflict Phase

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SSA Sensor Collection Strategy - Recommended Satellite Faces to Observe -



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Number denotes how much intelligence collection on this particular space object face will satisfy all intelligence requirement

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Prime Satellite Faces to Observe for a Particular Resident Space Object (RSO)

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Space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (SIPB) Tools

How to Organize Intelligence Collection Against Adversary Systems


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SIPB Main Menu Screen



SIPB Options Screen (1)



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SIPB Requirements Screen (1)

6				Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
\smile	 Home Create External Data Database 	e Tools Add-Ins			0
»	Space Warning and Assessment Tools 🏾 🖉 Space	e Situational Awareness Tools 🛛 🛒 PS-Switchbor	ard-SIPB-0 PS-Checkinst-Str D-0-0	±.0 Define Battlespace Environment	×
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	Level 1: Define the Battlespace Environment				
	Level 2: (3) Identify the limits of the Operational Are	ea (UA).			
	Level 3: Geosynchronous				
	Level 4: Active Geosynchronous Fixed				
		n) and <= 1.2 (31,037 km) and Eccentricity <=0.04 an	nd Inclination <= 1.0 Degrees		
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	Level 7:				
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jatic	Detailed INTEL Requirements:				
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z	INTEL Indicators:				
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SIPB Requirements Screen (2)

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2 0 Describe	Battlespace Effects 🛛 🗮 🔸 🛍 🚧 🕸 🗉	it in the second se	
Z.V Describe			
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Level 1: Describe the Battles	pace Effects		
	, significant physical characteristics of or locations in the battlespace.		
Level 3: Space Chara			
	y of good lighting conditions for optical sensors (Solar Phase Angle)		
Level 5:	, - <u></u>		
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	Optimize target sensing conditions		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Solar Phase Angle statistics for each orbital belt (Space Defense Area)		
Detailed INTEL Requirement			
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Resolution Requirement			
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		SIPB Step 2	

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SIPB Requirements Screen (3)

		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
Home	Create External Data Database Tools Add-Ins		0
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3.0 E	valuate Adversary		
Record 9	Number: 113 Scenario Name: Baseline equence: 111 Checklist STO Name: STO-1 Step: 3.2.1.20.4.5 Analysis Name: COA-1 ord Date: 12/20/2006 11:12:25 AM Completed Date: To Completed		
Level 1:	valuate the Adversary		
Level	2 (2) Create or update threat and other models		
Le	el 3: Doctrinal Templates		
	evel 4: Command and control requirements for space weapons		
	Level 5: Degree of Space Autonomous Operation		
	Level 6: Space Weapons Free	-	
	Level 7:		
	Level 9:		
	Level 10:		
Pane	Desired End Effect:		
	NTEL Requirement:		
-8	TEL Requirements:		
- <u>e</u> r	ITEL Derived From:		
z	INTEL Indicators:		
Resolu	ion Requirements:		
	Space NIIRS:		
	Detection Means:		
	Technologies:		
	Comments: In space defense, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target in or		
	Close to 800 Different		
	INTEL Requirements		
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SIPB Requirements Screen (4)

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	4.0 Determine	Adversary COA's 🦉 🔭 🚾 👫 🔛		
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		174 Checklist STO Name: STO-1		
	Step: 4.6.1.1.2			
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	Level 1: Determine Adversary			
		ominate collection requirements that monitor potential COA and key battlespace characteristics.		
		acterization Collection Requirements		
	Level 4: Ownership			
	Level 5: Satellite			
	Level 6: Mate	erials used		
	Level 7: Th	hidness		
	Level 8:			
	Level	19:		
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ane	Desired End Effect	t: Assure target validation		
e e		Determine what country is attacking blue side and which space systems are valid targets		
atic	Detailed INTEL Requirements			
Navig		1: Detailed Space Surveillance		
z	INTEL Indicators			
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
SIPB Requirements Screen (5)

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Record bates 12/20/2000 4:20:05 PM Completed bates		
Level 1: Determine Adversary Courses of Action		
Level 2: (3) Develop COA Based on Adversary Perception of Friendly Disposition (Reverse AIPB).		
Level 3: Possible Space Strategies.		
Level 4: Herd Blue space communications paths to those that are more easily monitored by Red SIGINT	assets	
Level 5:		
Level 6:		
Level 7:		
Level 8:		
Level 10:		
0		
End Desired End Effect: G Broad INTEL Requirement:		
Detailed INTEL Requirements:		
Difference internetics		
Z INTEL Indicators:		
Resolution Requirements:		
Space NIIRS:		
Detection Means:		
Technologies:		
Comments: Denying certain Blue Communications paths forces Blue to use other, more easily	exploitable, paths.	
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Record: H 4 55 of 371 + H HI K No Filter Search		
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	SIPB Step 4 Additional Example	
	Shi b Step 4 Autitoliai Example	

SIPB Options Screen (2)

		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
	Home Create External Data Database Tools Add-Ins Space Warning and Assessment Tools 💽 Space Situational Awareness Tools 🏹 PS-Switchboar	1-SIPB-0	@ ×
		Close ₽≁ Exit	
	1.11.21.3Analyze Commander's Mission in Relation to SpaceIdentify Detail Required and Feasible Within Time AvailableIdentify Limits of AO, AOI, and Battlespace	1.4 Determine Significant Characteristics of AO Environment	
Navigation Pane	1.5 1.6 Valuate Existing babases and lotter for the babase of	811 J310-1 C0A-1	
Review	ey points that should be considered, some of which may need to be addressed in more detail		Num Lock 🛛 🗃 🕮 🚇 😫
		SIPB Step 1 Sub-Categories (1)	
		UNCLASSIFIED	Page 118 of 211 Pages

SIPB Options Screen (3)



SIPB Options Screen (4)

			-	and the second se	Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)			
	Home Create External Data	Database Tools Add-Ins			space situational Awareness roots (554-1)			0
»	Space Warning and Assessment Tools			1.0 Define Battlespace Environment	t 1.6 Collect INTEL			×
		UNCLASSIF	IED					
		1.6	Close					
	Checklist	Collect INTEL to Further Space		Exit				
		Analysi	is					
	1.6.1	1.6.2	1.6.3	1.6.4				
	Recommended	Key Word Information	DIA Standard E	Equipment Code Information				
	PIR(s) / EEI(s) / RFI(s)	Search	Info Search	Search				
		Acro Glossary NAI Key	Node Types	Equip Person Aircraft				
0								
Navigation Pane								
gatior								
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		UNCLASSIF	IED ESOBTALS	JSTO-1 COA-1				
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				SIPB Step	1 Sub-Cate	egories (3)		

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SIPB Intelligence Collection Requirements (1)

		Sp	ace Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	And in the second s		
Home Create External Data Database Tools						0
Space Warning and Assessment Tools 🛒 Space Situatio	onal Awareness Tools 🛛 🕵 PS-Switchboard-SIPB-0	1.0 Define Dattiespace Livinonment	1.6 Collect INTEL 🗧 1.6.1 Recomm	nended PIR's, EEI's and RFI's		×
UNCLASSIFIED	Messages GBOSS	Report				
1.6.1 Recommended	Copy New Delete Find	Close				
PIR's / EEI's / RFI's	🔍 🕂 🕅 🛤	∎ E <u>x</u> it				
PIR Requirements PIR Coverage Zones PIR Data Formats PIR F	Requesting Organization PIR Supporting Organization PIF	R Info Organization				
	Exercise or Opertional?: EXER	RII 🖃 :Message Type				
Record Number: 96 Side: Red	Scenario Name: Operation Blue	Thunder 🚽				
PIR Number: 3.1.2.10	STO Name: STO-1					
Record Date: 1/8/2007 3:28:53 PM	Analysis Name: COA-1					
Data Source: ACE 10 Exercise	Completed Date: 1/20/2010 2:25:48 PM	🔽 Send 🔽 Sent				
PIR Category: Space	Target-Type: Satellite-Unmanned					
PIR Type: Tactical PIR	Target-Name: INMARSAT 3-F4					
PIR Name: Status - Manash Space-Based Nano GEO						
Supported Objective: Maintain Space Superiority to Control Adv						
PIR Priority: Low	Country: IMSO					
Priority Reason: General situational awareness	Mission: COMM-CIVIL - GEO - Active					
	Collection Start Time: 5/11/2010 8:00					
INTEL Collection Type 2: IMINT - IR	Collection End Time: 5/11/2010 11:00	0:00 PM 👤 Now				
INTEL Collection Type 3: IMINT - MSI	Collection Duration: 13:52					
INTEL Collection Type 4: SIGINT - ELINT - TELINT	Collection LTIOV: 5/12/2010 8:00					
INTEL Collection Type 5: MASINT - LASINT	Desired Collection Time: 5/11/2010 12:00	0:00 PM 🗨 Now				
	Other	Phase: (Fill In Below)				
		t-Conflict Phase 💌				
Collection Frequency: Monthly 🗨 Even	ry Monday 💌 Hourly 💌	Monthly				
General Comments: Conduct full RPO of OR Manash Space-Ba mission capabilities	ased Nano GEO Mine-Jammer (BE OR90F09012) to determine	probable military				
UNCLASSIFIED	OBT-1 J	STO-1 COA-1				
Record: II of 22 I II H K No Filter Search						
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	Priority Intel	ligence Re	auirement	s (PIR) Taski	ng Form	
	- inter inter		Yan enterit			

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SIPB Intelligence Collection Requirements (2)

	Home Create External Data Database Tool		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)		
»			1.0 Define Detuce Form	ended PIR's, EEI's and RFI's	×
	UNCLASSIFIED	Messages GBOSS	Report		
	1.6.1 Recommended	Copy New Delete Find	Close		
	PIR's / EEI's / RFI's	🔍 🖳 🛤 🔣 🛤	<mark>₽</mark> • E <u>x</u> it		
	PIR Requirements PIR Coverage Zones PIR Data Formats P	PIR Requesting Organization PIR Supporting Organization PI	R Info Organization		
	Select Orbite Min	al Range for PIR Max			
	Inclination 000.1427 📿	Inclination 000.1427 💌 Reset All			
	RAN 054.6122 -	RAN 054.6122 🖃			
	Eccentricity 0000000	Eccentricity 0000000 V			
	Arg Perigee 223.0000 💌 Mean Anomaly 235.5533 🔍	Arg Perigee 223.0000 🐷 MED			
	Mean Anomaly 235.5533 - Mean Motion 01.00271151 -	Mean Anomaly 235.5533 GEO Mean Motion 01.00271151 MOLY			
	Altitude 35,795 Km	Allitude 35,795 Km Sun-Sync			
	Longitude 218 Deg				
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on Pa					
rigati	Latitude:				
Nav	Longitude:				
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	Record: H ← 1 of 22 → H H3 K No Filter Search n of the Earth defined by Latitude (minimum value) that requi	ires INTEL monitoring			Num Lock 📴 🖪 🤀 😃 😫
- 9.01					
		Required PI	R Orbital (or Coogra	phic) Coverage Zones	
		Required I II	Constant (of Geogra	pine) Coverage Zolles	

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SIPB Intelligence Collection Requirements (3)

		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
	Add-Ins		Q
	Awareness Tools PS-Switchboard-SIPB-0 🛃 1.0 Defin	Sheet Form Livinonment III 1.6 Collect INTEL III 1.6.1 Recommended PIR's, EEI's and RFI's	x
UNCLASSIFIED	Messages GBOSS Rep	port	
1.6.1 Recommended	Copy New Delete Find Close		
PIR's / EEI's / RFI's	🔍 🙌 💹 👘	E <u>x</u> it	
PIR Requirements PIR Coverage Zones PIR Data Formats PIR Requ	uesting Organization PIR Supporting Organization PIR Info Organ		
Imagery Type: Any	Max Classification: Collateral Secret		
Imagery Orientation: All Faces			
	<u>-</u>		
Overall Format: Any	Softcopy Format Type: Any		
Hardcopy Format: Any	Softcopy Database: Local MIDB		
Hardcopy Print Size: Any	Softcopy Operating System: Windows		
	Softcopy Media Format: CD		
	Softcopy Host System: Any		
	Data Network: Any		
	OSS Setup State Vector		
	Now U: 0		
Event Type: 0	V: 0		
Category: 0	• 0		
	Tasking Description: Conduct full RPO of OR Mana Space-Based Nano GEO Mine	ie-	
Location Mode: ByName	Jammer (BE OR90F09012) to determine probable military n	mission	
	capabilities		
UNCLASSIFIED	BILL OBT-1 JSTO-1	COA-1 19	
Record: H 4 1 of 22 + H H3 1 No Filter Search			
rm View			Num Lock 📴 🖬 🏭 🕌
		equired PIR Data Formats	

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Terrestrial Forces Categories

Home Create External Data Database Tools	Add-Ins	Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)		
- 114		Battlespace Environment 📲 1.6 Collect INTEL 💽 Forces-Defaults 臂 Unit Data		×
UNCLASSIFIED	Equip Copy New Find	Delete Close		
	Review Person Enclosed Aircraft	🕷 💷		
Include Unit ID: US6WWCAXX	Unit Name: <mark>CMD OP CO, COR</mark>	PS SIG BN		
Operational Control: US6VVVVXX	Type: Forces			
Present Location Name:	Category: Engineer			
	Unit Type Code: 6WWCA			
Present Latitude:	Unit Level Code: CO Unit Type Code: AAS			
Present Longitude:	Authorized Personnel: 101			
Home Location Name:	Assigned Personnel: 95			
Home Latitude:	Country Code: US			
Home Longitude:	Data Source: GENERIC			
Ship Category:	Ship Hull Number:			
Ship Category Name:	Ship Class:			
UWCLASSIFIED	<u>087-1</u> JST0-1	COA-1		
Record: I4 4 1 of 247 H H X K No Filter Search				Num Lock 📑 🖽 🤀 🕊
	Terrestr	ial Forces Unit Data Do	efinitions	

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Terrestrial Forces Equipment Categories

	₩ 9 ~ 6 ~) -		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER	
<u> </u>	Home Create External Data Database Tool				۷
»	Space Warning and Assessment Tools Space Situ: UNCLASSIFIED		Define Battlespace Environment 🕼 1.6 Collect INTEL 🔀 Equipment I	Data	×
I		Equip Copy Naw Fit Review Append Person Image: Copy Image: C			
	Include Unit ID: US6WWCAXA	Quantity Required: 0			
	Equipment Code: R38403	Quantity Authorized: 0			
	Description: AC SATCOM RADIO S	SET: A Quantity On Hand: 2			
		Data Source: GENERIC			
	Type: <mark>COMM</mark>				
	Category: Radio Relay-Analog				
ane					
Navigation Pane					
Navige					

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Terrestrial Forces Equipment Data Definitions

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
SIPB Options Screen (5)

C			Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
	Home Create External Data L	Database Tools Add-Ins		() ×
»	Space Warning and Assessment Tools Checklist		d-SIPB-0 2.0 Describe Battlespace Effects Close Life Exit	×
	2.1 Operationally Significant Characteristics of Battlespace	2.2 2.3 <u>Neather Effects</u> <u>on Friendly and</u> <u>Adversary</u> <u>Operations</u> <u>Adversary Ops</u>	2.4 Battlespace Effects on Broad COA at Strategic/ Operational Level	
Navigation Pane	2.5 Battlespace Impact on Systems at Tactical Level			
		UNCLASSIFIED	18T-1 JSTO-1 COA-1	
Provi	ide the commander and planning staff an unders	tanding of battlespace aspects that provide operational be	SIPB Step 2 Sub-Categories	Num Lock 🛛 🖬 🕮 🕊

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
SIPB Options Screen (6)



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SIPB Options Screen (7)



Space Support Request Worksheet

		Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
Home Create External Data Database T			0
	ituational Awareness Tools PS-Switchboard-SIPB-0 5.7 Blue Sheet Form		×
UNCLASSIFIED	Copy New Delete Find Close		
5.7 Blue Space	es COA 📇 🕨 🛞 🌆 🎶 Exit		
Support Request			
Effects Effects Coverage Zones ROE Effects Request	ng Organization Effects Supporting Organization Effects Info Organization		
Record Number: 1 Side:	Red Scenario Name:		
Effect Number: E-1	STO Name: #Name?		
Record Date: 5/4/2010 9:25:55 Af	Analysis Name: #Name?		
Data Source: ACE 10 Exercise	Completion Date: #Name? Completed		
Effect Category: Diplomatic	Target-Type: Space-Related Ground Facility		
Effect Type: Diplomatic Pressure	Target:Name: Drari Salem Space Manufacturing Facility-South		
Effect Name: Pressure Orgonia to cease space	weapons 🗸 SATCAT Number:		
Effect Priority: 5.00	Update BE Number: OR90F36008		
Effect Priority Reason: Critical to prevent escalation to v		Automatically Ranked	
Effect Success Indicator: Reduced industrial production of			
Effect Description: Try convinving Orgonia to stop o	r reduce space weapons increased production rates to prevent arms buildup in region	According to SSA Priorities	
Supported COA: Hidden Disrupt	COA Number: 4.4.15.10		
COA Category: Pre-Conflict	COA Priority: Very High		
COA Type: OCS-Deceive	COA Priority Reason: Critical to preventing strategic surprise		
COA Likelihood: Medium Probability	COA Purpose: Red side loses confidence in his space systems		
Effect Method 1: Dislocatio Response 1	Category Effect Start Time Effect End Time Diplomatic \$/4/2010 \$/25:55 \$/4/2010 \$/7/2010 \$11:59:59 PM \$		
Effect Method 1: Diplomatic Request 1 Effect Method 2: Economic Pressure 1	Diplomatic S/4/2010 9:25:55 AM S/7/2010 11:59:59 PM Economic S/8/2010 S/14/2010 11:59:59 PM		
Effect Method 3: Cyber Attack 1	Covert Covert 5/15/2010 5/18/2010 11:59:59 PM		
Effect Method 4: B-2 Search & Destroy Sortie 1	✓ Destroy-Cont ✓ 5/19/2010 ✓ 5/20/2010 11:59:59 PM ✓		
Effect Method 5: GBU-24/B Flight 1	Destroy-Con S/19/2010 5/20/2010 11:59:59 PM		
Readiness Phase	Crisis / Deployment Phase Combat Phase Post-Conflict 💌		
Effect Frequency: Continuous	Continuous 💌 Daily 💌 Monthly 💌		
Effect Category: Diplomatic 💌	Economic 💌 Destroy-Conventional 💌 Covert 💌		
General Comments: Deny Orgonia the ability to ramp	up space weapons production; destroy their ability to produce new weapons during the con \fbox		
UNCLASSIFIED	OBT-1 JSTO-1 COA-1 co		
Record: 14 4 1 of 1 + H H2 K No Filter Searce			Num Lock 📴 🖽 🤀 😫
	Blue Side External In	formation or Support Dequast Form	
	Dide-Side External III	formation or Support Request Form	

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Additional Space Warfare Support Tools

Other Space Warfighting Tools

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Space Acronym Definitions

			Space Situational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)	
1		Database Tools Add-Ins Space Situational Awareness Tools Space Arronyms Sheet Form		
SI SI				
-	UNCLAS	Сору		
S	Space Acronyms	ViewViewDeleteSourcesDuplicatesDuplicates	▶ 👬 🗑 💷 Exit	
		Sources Duplicates Duplicates		
Use	e Date Term	Definition	Source / Comments	
Г		Dual Precipitation Radar	Earth Observing System Data and Information System Acronym and Abbreviation List; downloaded 8-14-08; http://www-v0ims.gsfc.nasa.gov/v0ims/acronym	
Г		Hazardous (Task Classification)	From: NASA/KSC Acronym List; downloaded 10-10-08; http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/inforcenter/acronym.htm	
Г	(\$)	Safe (Task Classification)	From: NASA/KSC Acronym List; downloaded 10-10-08; http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/inforcenter/acronym.htm	Contraction of the second s
Г	1 CACS	1st Command and Control Squadron (73 SGP), Cheyenne Mountain AS CO 80914-5000	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г.	1LT	First Lieutenant	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
-E	1 SCS	1st Satellite Control Squadronobsolete, now 1 SOPS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1 SLS	1st Space Launch Squadron (45 SW), Patrick AFB FL 32925	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1 SOPS	1st Space Operations Squadron (50 SW), 400 O'Malley Ave, Suite 35, Falcon AFB CO 80912-4035.	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1 SPSS	1st Space Surveillance Squadron (73 SGP), Griffiss AFB (Verona Annex) NY 13441-5000	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1 SWG	1st Space Wingobsolete, now 21 SW	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	10 MWS	10th Missile Warning Squadronobsolete, now 10 SWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	A CONTRACTOR OF THE
Г	10 SWS	10th Space Warning Squadron (21 SW), Cavalier AS ND 58220-5001formerly 10 MWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	Sector C
Г	1000 SOG	1000th Satellite Operations Groupobsolete, now 6 SOPS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	the second second second
Г	1001 SYSS	1001st Space Systems Squadronobsolete, now 21 SSYS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	State of the State of the State of the State
T	1002 CES	1002d Civil Engineering Squadronobsolete, now 50 CES	From: USSPACECOM/JSC, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	Colored States
П	1002 SPS	1002d Security Police Squadronobsolete, now 50 SPS	From: USSPACECOM/JSC, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1002 SSG	1002d Space Support Groupobsolete, now 50 SPTG	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1002 SSYS	1002d Space Systems Squadronobsolete, now 50 SSYS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Л	1003 MCCS	1003d Mobile Command and Control Squadronobsolete, now 721 MCCS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
П	1004 SPSSQ	1004th Space Support Squadronobsolete, now 750 SPTS	From: USSPACECOM/JSC, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
F	1012 ABS	1012th Air Base Squadronobsolete, now part of 12 SWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1013 CCTS	1013th Combat Crew Training Squadronobsolete, now 21 CTS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1015 ABS	1015th Air Base Squadronobsolete, now Det 1, 12 SWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1017 TES	1017th Test and Evaluation Squadroninactivated Oct 92	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	1022 CCTS	1022d Combat Crew Training Squadronobsolete, now 50 CTS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Γ	12 MWG	12th Missile Warning Groupobsolete, now 12 SWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
П	12 SWS	12th Space Warning Squadron (21 SW), Thule AB GL, APO NY 09023-5000formerly 12MWG; abs	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
П	1-2E	First-Second Echelon	From: Dunn klle, Comprehensive Acronym List, Schafer Corporation, July 1 2009	
Г	13 MWS	13th Missile Warning Squadronobsolete, now 13 SWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	13 SWS	13th Space Warning Squadron (21 SW), Clear AS AK 99704-5001formerly 13 MWS	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	and the second
Г	08-Feb-11 14 AF	14th Air Force	From: Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) Integration and Sustainment Statement of Work (SOW); Version 6.0; 1 February 2011	
Г	14 AF	14th Air Force, Vandenberg AFB CA	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm	
Г	14th	Fourteenth Air Force		
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Important to Get Future Space Warfare Definitions Correct

Space Acronym Data Sources

	Space Stuational Awareness Tools (SSA-T)							
- 63								
\sim	Home Create External Data Database Tools Add-Ins	۷						
*	🔄 Space Warning and Assessment Tools 🔄 Space Situational Awareness Tools 🔄 Space Acronyms 🔂 M-Dictionary Seet Form	×						
	Comments 7							
	From: "Enabling Concept For Space Situational Awareness (SSA)"; HQ AFSPC/A3CD; October 2007							
	From: ACE-10 Exercise Plan, 9 Nov 2009							
	From: ACE-10 Exercise Plan; 01 March 2010							
	From: Acronym List for Space and Astronomy, Mark Bradford; web site: http://tla.surly.org/, downloaded 2 Dec 2009							
	From: AFRL Acronyms - http://www.wpafb.af.mil/library/factsheet.asp?id=5987							
	From: AFRL Wargames Course, Glossary of Terms, Acronyms & Jargon, 21 April 2008							
	From: AFRL/RIEA Memo; 19 June, 2008							
	From: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9; 8 June 2006							
	From: Annex H TO JWID '00-01 Campaign Plan							
	From: BAE JAGUAR Brief; July 8 2009							
	From: Braeunig Space Glossary from https://gcic.af.mil/onesource; Downloaded 16 February 2011							
	From: Canonical Astronomy Abbrev/Acro List, James Marshall; web site: http://www.astro.umd.edu/~marshall/ast_acro.html, downloaded 2 Dec 2009							
	From: Cognitive Environment for Space Situation Awareness: Cognitive Task Analysis for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC); AFRL-RH-WP-TR-2009-00; James R. McCracken, Ph.D. & Michael J. Sellick; The Design Knowledge Company; March							
	From: 'Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century'; Forrest E. Morgan; RAND; 2008							
	From: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Modeling and Effects Simulation; AFRL/RDTE; January 2009							
	From: Defense Satellite Program Modeling and Effects Simulation; AFRL/RDTE; May 2007							
	From: Defense Support Program Early On-orbit Testing System Test Procedures; 66459-430-AAC003-067 REV F; 1 Apr 2002							
	From: DMS International; web site: http://www.dmsiusa.com/satexpo/glossary.htm, downloaded 4-14-09							
	From: Draper Laboratory Brief; undated - received July, 2008							
	From: Dunn Idle, Comprehensive Acronym List, Schafer Corporation, July 1 2009							
U	From: Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements; CICSI 3151.01A; 19 January 2007							
Pan	From: HQ Air Force Space Command Intelligence Directorate; Space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace; Human-to-Machine/Machine-to-Machine Interface Spiral 2 (FY08) Project Plan; September, 2007; Version 1.0							
u	From: JMS Program Commonly Used Acronyms', 2010							
Jatio	From: Johnson Space Center's Flight Design and Dynamics Division; downloaded 10-17-08; http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/realdata/elements/index.html From: 'Joint Publication 3-0; Joint Operations'; M. G. MULLEN, Admiral, U.S. Navy; 17 September 2006, Incorporating Change 2, 22 March 2010							
avig	From: Joint Publication 3-14; Space Operations; 66 January 2009							
Ž	From: Joint Publication 3-04, Space Operations, Volandary 2009 From: Joint Publication 3-04, Space Operations, Volandary 2009							
	From: You'n Space Operations Center (JSpCC) Mission System (JMS) High Accuracy Catalog (HAC) Technical Requirements Document (TRD) Solicitation No.: FA8707-11-R-0001 Attachment 2'; Version 2.1; 10 December 2010							
	From: Joint Space Operations Center (SpOC) Mission System (JMS) Integration and Sustainment Statement of Work (SOW); Version 6.0; J February 2011							
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	From: JP 1-02							
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	From: NASA Acronyms - downloaded 6-16-08: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/cgi/program=shuttle&searchall=true							
	From: NASA Science Glossary from https://gcic.af.mil/onesource; Downloaded 16 February 2011							
	From: NASA/KSC Acronym List; downloaded 10-10-08; http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/inforcenter/acronym.htm							
	From: NOAA; downloaded 8-14-08; http://solar-center.stanford.edu/gloss.html							
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	From: The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets; FM 90-36; MCRP 3-16.1F; NWP 2-01.11; AFJPAM 10-225; JULY 1997							
	From: University of Military Intelligence Acronyms - downloaded 5-29-08: http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/article.asp?articleIDprev=321&articleID=319&issueID=21							
	From: USSPACECOM/J5C, UPAM13-1, 30 Jun 1994, "Space Lexicon" - http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/pam13;1.htm							
	From: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base AFRL Acronyms List; web site: http://www.wpafb.af.mil/library/factsheet./factsheet.asp?id=5987; downloaded: 4-16-2009							
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Future Space Warfare Data Sources

Future Space Warfare Doctrine Definitions

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Space Warning and .	Assessment Tools Space Sit	tuational Awareness Tools Space Glossary Sheet Form	030		
Space Glo			E <u>x</u> it		
Use Date	Term	Definition	Source	Comments	
	Active Space Defense	Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile space actions. It includes the use of anti-satellite weapon systems, defensive counter space weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons not primarily used in a space defense role. See also Space Defense.	Modified from Joint Pub 3-01.1		
<u> </u>	Broadcast-Controlled Space Interception	An interception in which the interceptor is given a continuous broadcast of information concerning the space defense situation and effects interception without further control.	Modified from Joint Pub 3-01.1		
	Close-Controlled Space Interception	An interception in which the interceptor is continuously controlled to a position from which the target is within local sensor range.	Modified from Joint Pub 3-01.1		
	Counterspace	Those operations conducted with the objective of gaining and maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space environment.	AFPAM 14-118 5 JUNE 2001		*
V	Counterspace	Those offensive and defensive operations conducted by air, land, sea, space, special operations, and information forces with the objective of gaining and maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space environment. (AFDD 2-2)	AFDD 2-2.1 2, August 2004		
	Defensive Counterspace	Operations to preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from adversary attack or interference. Also called DCS.	AFDD 2-2.1 2, August 2004		
	Military Space Forces	Those national, civil, and commercial space systems and associated infrastructure that establish space power and are employed by the military to achieve national security objectives. Space forces include space-based systems, ground- based systems for tracking and controlling objects in space and transmiting through space, launch systems that deliver space elements, and people who operate, maintain, or support those systems. Terrestrial-based forces operate below	AFPAM 14-118 5 JUNE 2001		an a
	Offensive Counterspace	Operations to preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. Also called OCS. (AFDD 2-2.1)	AFDD 2-2.1 2, August 2004		
N	Passive Space Defense	All measures, other than Active Space Defense, taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage to space systems caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative. These measures include camouflage, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction and design. See also Space Defense.	Modified from Joint Pub 3-01.1		
	Space	A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve US national security objectives. (JP 1-02)	AFDD 2-2.1 2, August 2004		
	Space Autonomous Operation	In space defense, the mode of operation assumed by a space system after it has lost all communications with human controllers. The space system assumes ful responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets, based in accordance with no-baord surveillance and weapon system control logic. This automatic state may occur on a requisir basis due to orbital movements outside regions of ground coverage and control.	Modified from Joint Pub 3-01.1		
	UNCLASSIFIED	1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission	AFDD 2-2.1 2, August		
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Important to Get Future Space Warfare Concepts Defined

Satellite Failures and Potential Fixes Database

Enables Warfighters to Better Understand Whether Satellite Failures are Natural, Intentional or Accidental

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
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Satellite Failures Database


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Comnents	It all entropical or private with a start mask with a triat so very long periods of visibility, at substantial ranges (up to 60,000 km), and short periods at only a few thousand kilometres. In January 2005, the setallite's primary battery failed and the secondary battery was not sufficiently charged to take over at this. As a result, the satellite's transmissions ceased. Operators were still optimistic as as AO-40 in spring 2005 was entering into a sun angle increasingly favourable for recharging the batteries. (Sources: AO-40 FAO, AMSAT News Service Bulletin) Last updated: 21 February 2005				
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Detailed List of Commercial Satellite Failures

Satellite Failures Database Statistics (1)




Satellite Failures Database Statistics (2)



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
Satellite Failures Database Statistics (3)



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Satellite Failures Database Statistics (4)



Statistics of Natural Close Approaches Between Space Objects

Statistics on How Often do Space Objects Naturally Approach Each Other Without Willful Intent

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
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Typical Satellite Encounters


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	Record	Target	Threat	Encounter Time	Range (km)	Target Epoch	Threat Epoch	T+ V	T V	T 7	Theory V	Theo - 4 V	The	T	T	T+ 1/7	Theres
		R-Live-27422-IDEFIX	R-Live-25982-ORBCOMM FM-32	2006/02/19 18:39:30.983 UTC	0.0705	2/14/2006 4:47:34 AM	2/14/2006 1:13:54 PM	Target_X 3190.8199	Target_Y -4125.0007	Target_Z -4929.3998	Threat_X 3190.8128	Threat_Y -4124.9347	Threat_Z -4929.4234	-4.27452287	Target_VY 3.01755849	-5.3051431	5.0080°
	2	U-Live-25875-GLOBALSTAR-M028	U-Dead-23001-COSMOS 2270	2006/02/27 09:36:50.310 UTC	0.1108	2/13/2006 11:24:54 PM	2/13/2006 10:24:23 PM	7498.3336	1468.059	-1535.0276	7498.4191	1468.1295	-1535.0314	-1.93370279	4.19698339	-5.46026899	1.1777
	3	U-Live-25119-FM-07	U-Dead-16011-COSMOS 1680	2006/03/17 11:24:56.198 UTC	0.1273	2/14/2006 3:15:55 AM	2/14/2006 9:44:35 AM	-3352.2105	4135.1836	-4786.7502	-3352.1449	4135.2314	-4786.8482	-6.48276207	-3.26662137	1.71764199	-5.0578
	4	U-Live-25396-TMSAT	U-Dead-733-Rocket Body	2006/03/04 19:38:20.268 UTC	0.131	2/14/2006 4:10:34 AM	2/13/2006 8:32:59 PM	1832.6704	-677.9304	6911.449	1832.6196	-677.9834	6911.3405	4.2399069	-5.88367245	-1.69868708	-6.9688
	5	U-Live-23545-FM-01	U-Dead-26123-Debris	2006/02/25 22:33:02.529 UTC	0.1385	2/14/2006 12:41:20 PM	2/13/2006 5:26:34 PM	5326.6742	-2819.5389	-3692.7021	5326.7498	-2819.5983	-3692.6024	-1.76057595	4.34419374	-5.86910387	-4.0259
	6	U-Live-25991-DMSP 5D-3-F15	U-Dead-28324-Deb-USA 073	2006/03/02 15:42:26.207 UTC	0.1544	9/28/2003 8:18:02 PM	7/18/2016 11:51:07 AM	-2809.0025	4196.4538	-5153.9555	-2809.0271	4196.3316	-5153.8644	-1.54320487	5.19981631	5.07998289	4.2104
	7	U-Live-25872-GLOBALSTAR-M048	U-Dead-1549-Debris	2006/02/21 08:00:58.350 UTC	0.1644	2/13/2006 10:39:38 PM	7/19/2016 8:56:18 AM	4734.5276	-2813.9853	5501.4152	4734.586	-2814.0897	5501.5281	5.3266694	4.08059789	-2.49153344	-0.1667
	8	U-Live-25770-GLOBALSTAR-M025	U-Dead-21784-COSMOS 2170	2006/02/20 11:55:48.324 UTC	0.1703	2/13/2006 6:17:07 PM	2/13/2006 7:17:27 PM	-4307.8775	6140.4678	2106.0885	-4307.9475	6140.3255	2106.0262	-2.88688751	-3.85057014	5.2948516	-1.8879
	9	U-Live-25528-IRIDIUM-086	U-Dead-13992-Rocket Body	2006/03/16 18:59:32.255 UTC	0.1745	2/14/2006 5:05:30 AM	2/13/2006 11:03:52 PM	503.8487	1913.9437	6869.6571	503.9422	1913.7964	6869.6581	0.13652421	7.18856182	-2.0072716	-6.9555
	10	U-Live-27818-COSMOS 2398	U-Dead-13301-COSMOS 1383	2006/02/27 19:24:14.304 UTC	0.1826	2/13/2006 11:21:55 PM	2/14/2006 1:50:31 AM	2078.1229	1505.7358	-6933.9398	2078.009	1505.8762	-6933.9141	-6.73028549	-1.67362362	-2.36130303	3.6838
	11	U-Live-25986-ORBCOMM FM-34	U-Dead-17117-Debris	2006/03/04 10:27:55.581 UTC	0.1845	2/14/2006 2:18:28 AM	2/14/2006 12:22:03 AM	2647.5988	4711.7214	4711.9094	2647.7295	4711.7707	4711.7889	-6.92996246	1.94186814	1.95564591	-1.0742
	12	U-Live-25272-IRIDIUM-055	U-Dead-23286-Debris	2006/03/05 10:43:22.538 UTC	0.1866	2/14/2006 3:33:27 AM	2/14/2006 2:16:29 AM	4677.4189	2979.1643	-4535.1305	4677.495	2979.2912	-4535.2443	-4.29097103	-2.01490179	-5.75288256	3.3412
	13	U-Live-25169-IRIDIUM-052	U-Dead-27677-Debris	2006/03/10 23:18:12:079 UTC	0.2097	2/14/2006 3:52:27 AM	7/18/2016 11:50:19 PM	-310.0949	5852.1051	-4119.6379	-309.9061	5852.1678	-4119.7042	-0.34634206	-4.29740063	-6.08253504	1.0483
a	14	U-Live-23455-NOAA 14	U-Dead-6659-METEOR 1-15	2006/03/04 10:00:11.578 UTC	0.2203	2/14/2006 11:59:01 AM	2/14/2006 6:56:03 AM	-1417.4675	4196.0915	5698.0611	-1417.6319	4196.1026	5698.2074	3.62240835	-4.76433187	4.4081944	-3.5840
n Pa	15	U-Live-24872-IRIDIUM-018	G-Dead-9293-Debris	2006/03/03 09:44:11.748 UTC	0.2225	2/14/2006 7:00:02 AM	7/18/2016 5:20:07 PM	-845.4734	1937.5379	6828.5954	-845.6116	1937.3763	6828.5298	-4.2423095	5.75398943	-2.15194439	5.6919
atio	16	U-Live-28737-SHI JIAN-7	U-Dead-12987-COSMOS 1328	2006/03/13 15:44:41.439 UTC	0.2255	2/14/2006 7:43:20 PM	2/14/2006 1:49:26 PM	3194.3122	6048.1942	1198.8998	3194.2778	6047.9762	1198.8534	0.28695491	-1.62583485	7.39470742	-0.2750
avig	17	G-Live-26094-LOUISE	U-Dead-4048-Rocket Body	2006/03/04 18:31:23.283 UTC	0.2301	2/14/2006 5:03:53 PM	2/14/2006 11:00:02 AM	2180.6975	651.5398	·6775.2475	2180.7827	651.3661	-6775.372	6.81013579	-2.29013925	2.00037666	-5.0217
Ž	18	U-Live-28413-SHI JIAN-6A	U-Dead-13403-Rocket Body	2006/03/16 17:30:49.797 UTC	0.2395	2/14/2006 7:14:15 PM	2/13/2006 6:24:39 PM	-812.2756	1316.3224	-6803.1289	-812.3561	1316.3741	-6803.3485	0.82558497	7.38513183	1.34110755	-1.6551
	19	U-Live-25489-ATEX	U-Dead-8682-Debris	2006/03/11 02:15:02.230 UTC	0.2402	7/8/2004 2:24:06 AM	2/14/2006 8:56:25 PM	138.7036	-959.2374	-7054.4919	138.5635	-959.0477	-7054.5372	3.94131857	6.29972045	-0.78728964	-7.3184
	20	U-Live-24840-IRIDIUM-013	U-Dead-11587-Debris	2006/03/07 22:44:20.842 UTC	0.2474	2/14/2006 4:47:14 AM	2/14/2006 8:53:10 AM	-485.5309	1492.3771	-6989.7899	-485.7352	1492.2553	-6989.7218	0.11771516	-7.28263311	-1.56181637	-5.8474
	21	U-Live-25286-IRIDIUM-063	U-Dead-9023-Rocket Body	2006/03/08 17:23:35.674 UTC	0.2491	2/14/2006 7:39:20 AM	2/14/2006 7:21:17 PM	-3859.9488	2252.7802	5580.8983	-3860.0678	2252.9293	5580.7382	4.63412126	-3.57294477	4.63845364	2.8665
	22	R-Live-27421-SPOT 5	U-Dead-27840-MONITOR-E & R/B	2006/03/05 00:38:39.628 UTC	0.2576	2/14/2006 6:13:04 PM	2/14/2006 10:28:34 AM	998.0975	582.4918	7102.495	998.1141	582.387	7102.2603	5.59471563	-4.88999736	-0.38378566	1.3065
	23	U-Live-20436-SPOT 2		2006/02/22 04:49:33.643 UTC	0.2586	2/14/2006 7:53:25 PM	2/13/2006 2:55:37 AM	-4252.5266	5551.8565	1730.4788	-4252.7243	5552.005	1730.5545	2.00296159	-0.70150608	7.13138956	-2.5951
	24		U-Dead-6061-Rocket Body	2006/03/17 21:56:00.722 UTC	0.2643	10/4/2003 2:05:17 AM	2/13/2006 6:11:54 PM	2138.9768	2750.1303	-6225.0273	2139.1671	2750.0187	-6225.173	2.88085129	5.88095388	3.58560951	-6.6315
	25		U-Dead-18152-COSMOS 1862	2006/02/24 07:49:11.431 UTC	0.2668	2/14/2006 9:34:21 PM	2/14/2006 3:33:35 AM	2362.7895	-1146.355	6427.2935	2362.8146	-1146.4549	6427.5397	4.74226038	-5.31362333	-2.62579198	-4.7871
	26	U-Live-25482-FM-28		2006/03/15 21:51:23.622 UTC	0.2703	2/14/2006 5:00:26 PM	7/18/2016 4:35:01 AM	-654.0122	6288.303	-3389.668	-654.1209	6288.3743	-3389.431	-6.16485104	1.47418505	3.92208021	0.8414
	27	U-Live-28254-ROCSAT-2		2006/03/02 19:34:07.804 UTC	0.2735	2/14/2006 9:46:56 PM	2/13/2006 5:02:45 PM	394.0228	-2298.5367	-6894.0162	394.1135	-2298.4395	-6893.7772	-4.61209251	5.3949808	-2.06202218	-2.5343
	28		U-Dead-26123-Debris	2006/03/08 12:47:27.008 UTC	0.2797	2/15/2006 12:03:17 AM	2/13/2006 5:26:34 PM	-891.1162	-875.8455	-7022.6466	-891.1996	·875.6916	-7022.4285	-0.6146033	7.3904069	-0.84690418	-7.2439
	29		U-Dead-19769-COSMOS 1992	2006/02/27 12:14:29.377 UTC	0.2837	2/14/2006 8:48:49 PM	2/14/2006 7:34:47 AM	-4556.5695	1672.3518	5235.6802	-4556.5886	1672.1299	5235.5045	-4.3221302	3.65915136	-4.88168621	3.6660;
	30		U-Dead-18764-Debris	2006/03/15 06:47:22.886 UTC	0.2884	2/14/2006 1:27:19 PM 2/14/2006 7:22:06 PM	2/14/2006 9:19:37 PM	4456.8379 3788.3883	-2249.0965 6043.5132	-4989.9577	4456.9518	-2249.2458	-4990.1765	3.97403828	-3.68280263	5.20803857	-2.0339
		U-Live-23710-RADARSAT-I R-Live-25981-ORBCOMM FM-31	U-Dead-7412-Hocket Body U-Dead-9415-0PS 5721	2006/02/17 16:11:36.579 UTC 2006/02/16 15:06:06.483 UTC	0.2888	2/14/2006 7:22:06 PM	2/14/2006 1:01:00 PM 3/21/2004 6:51:35 PM	-1216.3933	-6992.5	-763.2011 -1059.7489	3788.5947	6043.7129 -6992.7858	-763.2314	5.37956362	0.06447718	-5.15969233	0.5237
	32	R-Live-25981-ORBCOMM FM-31 R-Live-25981-ORBCOMM FM-31	U-Dead-9415-DMSP 5D-1-F01	Contraction of the local division of the loc	0.291	2/14/2006 3:26:43 AM		-1216.3933	-6992.5	-1059.7489	-1216.3397	-6992.7858 -6992.7858	-1059.7361	5.37956362	-0.15405109	-5.15969233	-1.3470
	33	R-Live-25981-ORBCOMM FM-31 R-Live-25981-ORBCOMM FM-31	U-Dead-9415-DMSP 5D-1-F01	2006/02/16 15:06:06.483 UTC 2006/02/16 15:06:06.483 UTC	0.291	2/14/2006 3:26:43 AM	3/21/2004 6:51:35 PM 3/21/2004 6:51:35 PM	-1216.3933	-6992.5	-1059.7489	-1216.3397	-6992.7858	-1059.7361	5.37956362	-0.15405109	-5.15969233	-1.3470
	- 34	UNCLASSIF		2006/02/16 13:06:06:463 01C	0.231	271472000 3.20.43 AM	372172004 0.31.33 FM	1210.3333	10332.3	1033.7403	1210.3337	0332.7030	1033.7301	3.37330302	0.10400100	3.13303233	1.3470
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Historical Space Object Close Approach Examples

Typical Satellite Encounters Statistics (1)



Typical Satellite Encounters Statistics (2)




Statistics of Lost Space Objects

How Often does the JSpOC Lose Track of Space Objects

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JSpOC Catalog Missing Space Objects



Space Object Tracks are Frequently & Easily Lost

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Details Page 145 of 211 Pages


Statistics of Natural Kinetic Penetrations on Typical Satellite Materials

Statistics on How Often Space Objects are Naturally Penetrated by Micrometeorites

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LDEF Penetration Size & Frequency



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Space Object State Change Algorithms

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SSA-T Databases

- Space Objects: 37,932 Records
 - Also Includes Decayed Objects
- Orbital Elements: 5.3 Million Records
 - 15 Months of Data Internal to SSA-T
 - All Orbital Data Since 1957 In External Archives
- RADAR Cross Sections: 1.5 Million Records
 - All RCS's for All Space Objects Since 1957
- Satellite Characteristics History: 7.5 Million Records — Almost 3 Years History for All Space Objects (Live & Dead)
- Optical Visual Magnitude & Flash Rate: 73 Thousand
- Space Acronyms: 35,542 Records

Example State Changes

- GPS (Verbal Discussion)
- ECHOSTAR 5
- MOLNIYA
- Beidou GEO

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
ECHOSTAR 5 Maneuver



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
ECHOSTAR 5 Correlations



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
MOLNIYA Decay



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Beidou - GEO Maneuver



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
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SSA-T State Change Benefits

- Filters 11,496 Space Objects Down to Top 10-20 With Most Activity for More Detailed Assessment by Other Space INTEL Assets
- Possible Discovery of Hidden Adversary Intent
- May Indicate Dying or Dead Satellites Before JSpOC Assessment
- Helps Evaluate Friendly Satellite Cover Stories
- Success Working Now & Ready for Operational Evaluation

SSA-T Determines If Space Systems Have Changed State – Could Signal an ASAT Attack

Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) – All Altitudes




Space Has Choke Points As In Terrestrial Systems – They're Just Not Stationary

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Traditional Orbital View




>12,000 Space Objects Confuses Users as to Possible Attack Patterns Developing

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SAW – Icons

- Based on Mil-Std-2525B
- 220 New Space Icons




Make SAW Maps Similar to Terrestrial Situation Maps

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
SAW – View 1



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
SAW – View 2



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SAW – SDIZ




SSA Detection Zones Help Partial Out Operational Responsibility

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SAW – Simulated Attack Against GPS




Major Maneuvers of Space Objects are Easily Visualized

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SAW – "Dead" Stages as ASATS




Simultaneous Attack Maneuvers Can Easily be Detected

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SAW – Multiple Attacks Against One GPS




Space Objects Playing Dead Can be Detected With Unusual Movements


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SAW – 3D View (1)




SAW – 3D View (2)



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
SAW – 3D View (3)



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
SAW – Space Objects Within Weapons Range





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SAW – Flat Map View




SAW Displays 3D Space Situation Maps

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Space Choke Points




There are Many Potential Sources of Attack

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Example Attack Locations Optimized for Space Surveillance




Some Parts of a Satellite's Orbit May Be More Vulnerable than Others

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
Example Threat Envelope View 1



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
Example Threat Envelope View 2



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
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ASAT Range / Access Assessments



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
Avoid Space Radar - Hopper



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Avoid Space Radar - Slider






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
Avoid Space Radar - Skipper



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Hide Satellite Among Others



Goal: Appear Like Nearby Satellite

Delta-V Required for 2-Burn Hohmann Transfer Rendezvous

Satellites Can Maneuver to Confuse Targeting Assets

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Space Surveillance Network



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SSA-T Contacts

Name	Organization	Phone
Paul Szymanski	Space Strategies Center	(505) 504-2057 [GMT-7]

"Vision without action is daydream. Action without vision is nightmare" (Old Japanese Proverb)

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BACKUP

"It is not the object of war to annihilate those who have given provocation for it, but to cause them to mend their ways." - Polybius, History (2nd century B.C.) -

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Principles of War

- Objective
- Offensive
- Mass
- Economy of Force
- Maneuver
- Unity of Command
- Security
- Surprise
- Simplicity

Principles of War Equally Applicable to Space & Terrestrial Warfare

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Space Principles of War Example

Mass

- Terrestrial: "Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time"
- Space: Are there sufficient weapons to achieve <u>continuous</u>, or sustained space control. Can the adversary re-configure to avoid attack. Are the space weapons overwhelming to the military function they are trying to deny. Is there political will to implement massed space attack. Can space weapons get into position at the decisive place and time. Do we know the decisive place and time for space weapons application. Can space weapons be synchronized for employment simultaneously.

Space Strategy Planning Has Not Had the Benefit of a Long History

Space Strategies Example

Title:

Herd Space Personnel

Action:

Destroy all Red space-related ground targets, except purposely lightly damage one ground center. Assume that key space support personnel will converge to this lightly damaged site to conduct repairs. 12 hours later, use anti-personnel weapons at this site, with destroy weapons 2 hours later.

Desired Effect:

Destroys Red country's most import space asset: key technically trained space personnel. Also sends message to international community that foreign personnel supporting Red space efforts will be at risk.



Space Strategies Derived From Sun Tzu


- Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" (544 BC 496 BC) Used to Derive Modern Space Strategies
- Analysis In Progress
 - 546 Space Warfare Strategies Already Derived
 - Only 1/3 the Way Through Sun Tzu's Teachings

	Nar																			
F	Force Status																			
	Sun Tzu Sta	atement 1	: When ab	le to attack	we must	eem unable. \	Vhen using o	our forces, we	nust seem ina	active. Prete	end to be wea	k, that he may	y grow arrog	ant.						
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 1:	Deploy ma	ny covert sp	ace weapon sy:	tems & sens	ors with remote	basing (air, sea	a, undersea,	ground mobile	space, Moon).								
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 2:	Deploy spa	ce weapon	systems & sen	ors with mult	i-spectral carnou	flage coverings											
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 3:	Deploy spa	ce weapon	systems & sen:	ors in space	with low observa	bles coatings.											
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 4:	Deploy spa	ce weapon	systems & sen:	ors in space	with special sha	pes that do not	t readily refle	ect light back to	the Earth.								
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 5:	Deploy spa	ce weapon	systems & sen:	ors in space	that can change	attitude so the	y do not rea	adily reflect ligh	back to the Ea	arth.							
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 6:	Deploy cov	ert space w	apon systems	& sensors in	unusual orbits to	avoid detectio	n and precis	se targeting (hid	hly eccentric, L	agrangian poi	ints, betweer	geosynchror	nous orbits and	the Moon, & b	evond the Me	oon).	
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 7:	Deploy cov	ert space w	apon systems	& sensors that	at continuously of	hange their ort	oits while out	tside an advers	ary's sensor co	verage (e.g., r	naneuver ove	r the South F	acific and the l	Poles). Continu	ious low-level	thrusting may	frustrate
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 8:	Develop co	ert space v	eapon systems	that hide insi	ide innocuous s	ace objects (c	ivilian & scie	ence missions;	space objects	playing dead).	Have exit de	ors on side o	f space object	away from the	Earth (zenith	face) & most :	sensors.
	Space	Warfare	Strategy 9:	Develop so	me overt sp	ice weapon svs	tems that sta	v in garrison, or	are transported	to other the	eaters that do r	ot threaten the	theater that o	ne is plannin	g to attack.					
	Space V	Warfare S	trategy 10:	Develop so	me overt sp	ice weapon svs	tems that hav	e limited technic	al and operation	onal capabilit	ties and appea	to be the main	space threat.	but a covert	weapon syst	em is actually	firing at the sa	me time as th	e overt system	n.
	Space V	Warfare S	trategy 11:	Develop so	me overt sp	ice weapon sva	tems that hav	e limited technic	al and operation	nal capabilit	ties and that wi	I adsorb an ad	ersary's main	spoiling or a	ounter-attack	s (including S	OF HUMINT 8	Cyber attack	ks that may tak	ke consid
								ns that can also												
	Space V	Warfare S	trategy 13:	Develop a r	an for space	e sensors to "o	no" space ob	jects according	o a harmless.	pre-planned	schedule that	does not reveal	plans for a su	rorise attack	against inter	ded targets.				
								objects that an												
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Methods of War Are Eternal UNCLASSIFIED



Space Centers of Gravity Model



Space Systems Strategic Targeting Is Similar to Terrestrial Targeting Strategies

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Example Space Centers of Gravity

Launch corridors
GEO belt sectors
Sun-Synchronous LEO orbits
GEO satellites changing orbital position
Space-related command centers / commanders / INTEL Centers
Space surveillance systems
Space technicians / scientists
Electric grid serving ground space facilities
Space design and manufacturing facilities
Leader's confidence in their new space technologies
Blue and Red side political will to start and continue a space war
Space-related decision cycle times (OODA loops)
Low delta-v/transit time points in space to reach High Value Targets
Points in space with high/low coverage from space surveillance assets
Regions of space and time with advantageous solar phase angles
Times of high solar storm activity
On-orbit spares or launch replenishment or ability to reconstitute space capability with terrestrial systems
Antipodal nodes 180 degrees from launch sites around the world
Manned launch (Shuttle, Space Station) of satellites
Initial satellite checkout after launch or orbital insertion
Periods of solar eclipse / low battery charge for satellites
Approach trajectories outside the field of regard of the target's on-board sensors
Approach trajectories when the Sun/Moon/Earth is in the background of a target's sensors
Approach trajectories outside normally employed orbits
Near a satellite's thrusters
Near a satellite's high power antennas
Just after loss of contact with adversary satellite ground controllers / space surveillance assets

SSA-T Has Extensive Space Centers of Gravity Checklists

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SSA-T Automatic Determination of Red Space Attack Strategies

- Database of Possible Red Space Attack Strategies are Linked to Checklist of INTEL Indicators of Space Systems Activities
- Most Probable Red Space Strategy Is Determined Based On Currently Observed INTEL Indications of Space Activities
- SSA-T Automatically Increases Space INTEL Collection Priorities In IPB Tasking Forms Based On Probable Red Actions

SSA-T Helps the Satellite Analyst Determine If Space Systems Are Under Attack

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INTEL Indicators Example

1.2.5.1.5.21 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Wear On Roads at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.22 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Improved / New Roads at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.23 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Improved / New Parking at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.24 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Improved / New Railroad Tracks at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.25 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Improved / New Railroad Sidings at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.26 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Disturbed Vegetation / Soil at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.27 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Different Communications Patterns To / From Sites 1.2.5.1.5.27.1 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Communications Traffic To / From Sites 1.2.5.1.5.27.2 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Decreased (More Attempts to Hide) Communications Traffic To / From Sites 1.2.5.1.5.27.3 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers No Net Increase or Decrease of Communications Traffic To / From Sites, But Changed Patterns 1.2.5.1.5.27.4 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Encrypted Communications Traffic To / From Sites Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Hours / New Shifts for Personnel at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.28 1.2.5.1.5.29 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Scientists & Engineers at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.30 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Military Personnel at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.31 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Military Personnel of Higher Ranks at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.32 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Foreign Personnel at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.33 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of VIPs at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.34 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Housing Demand In Local Area 1.2.5.1.5.35 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers New / Expanded / Improved Housing Built On-Site 1.2.5.1.5.36 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers New / Expanded / Improved Recreational Facilities On-Site 1.2.5.1.5.37 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Food Intake 1.2.5.1.5.38 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Power Consumption 1.2.5.1.5.39 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Water Consumption 1.2.5.1.5.40 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Sewer Outake 1.2.5.1.5.41 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Refuse Outake 1.2.5.1.5.42 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Smoke Plumes from Sites 1.2.5.1.5.43 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Chemical Contamination at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.44 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers New or Increased Settling / Effluents Ponds at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.45 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Use of Data Processing Assets at Site 1.2.5.1.5.46 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased / Different Patterns of Thermal Images 1.2.5.1.5.47 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Large Mobile Vehicles with Erection Gantries at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.48 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Mobile Vehicles with Cooling at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.49 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Chemical Support Equipment at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.50 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Optical Test Equipment at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.51 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of RF Test Equipment at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.52 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Electrical Test Equipment at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.53 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Optical Test Stands at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.54 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of RF Test Stands at Sites Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Number of Large Mobile Vehicle Storage Sheds at Sites 1.2.5.1.5.55 1.2.5.1.5.56 Chicanean Yuan Hsi Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT Manufacturing Centers Increased Security at Sites

Example Space Objectives

- 5,000 Other Space Objectives Blind Blue capabilities to observe the terrestrial battlefield Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from terrestrial sensors Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from space-based sensors Spoof Blue capabilities to observe the battlefield Deny Blue ability to launch new satellites Destroy some Blue space capability as a warning to Gray space systems support to Blue Wear down Blue Defensive Counter-Space capabilities by instigating multiple false alarm attacks Attack Blue satellites before the start of the terrestrial conflict Spoof Blue perceptions of Red space strengths Conduct diplomatic offensive to restrict Blue ability to employ ASAT's Actively defend key launch corridors and orbits critical to Red conduct of war Preposition Red space assets to maximize their effectiveness at the start of the conflict Disrupt Blue command and control capabilities for space systems Embargo Blue access to space systems Prevent Blue ability to service or re-fuel on-orbit satellites Develop propaganda campaign against Blue use of ASAT's Shape and delay Blue plans for space warfare Deny Blue ability to achieve Space Situational Awareness Disrupt Blue space attacks so they become uncoordinated Constantly shift points of application of space control weapons to confuse adversary response Herd Blue space communications paths to those that are more easily monitored by Red SIGINT assets Attack key Blue space personnel and technicians Disperse Red assets (maneuver satellites) just before launching first attack

SSA-T Has Space Objectives for Both Red & Blue Sides

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Example Space COA Indicators

Are a small number of Blue and Gray satellites experiencing anomalies over a long time period

Are a small number of Blue and Gray satellites losing contact with terrestrial controllers

Are a small number of new Red satellites appearing in orbit

Are a small number of Red satellites changing orientation

Are a small number of Red satellites changing shape

Are a small number of Red satellites changing thermal signatures

Are a small number of Red satellites concentrating towards potential Blue and Gray satellites

Are Red ASAT forces appearing to line up in a sequence of timed attacks against Blue and Gray assets

Are Red forces capable of attacking space-related terrestrial sites in Blue countries appearing to line up in a sequence of timed attacks

Are Red SIGINT assets appearing to line up in a sequence of timed operations against Blue and Gray Communications assets

Are there indications of Red aircraft activities that appear to concentrate on space-related terrestrial sites around the world

Are there indications of Red missile activities that appear to concentrate on space-related terrestrial sites around the world

Are there a small number of new satellite launches from Red facilities

Many Insignificant Space Indicators May Add Up to Predicting a Major Attack

COA Reactions Example

Time				Escalation	Probability			
Sequence	Category	Actor	Target	Ladder	of Occurrence	WBS	Action	Reaction
35	Satellites	Califon	Newmex	P.4.A.1	8	N.S.R.3	Newme	x Bicudo Large LEO Photo Satellite is permanently partially blinded when over flying the disputed oil fields
35A	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	1	N.S.R.3.0		Do nothing to increase escalation ladder
35B	INTEL	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.1		Determine if degradation is caused by natural events, equipment failure or human actions, whether intentional or unintentional
35C	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.2		Increase military alert level (DEFCON)
35D	Ground Stations	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.3		Contact other Newmexian space-related ground facilities to determine if multiple ground outage incidents are occurring
35E	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.4		Contact other Newmexian TTC ground facilities to determine if multiple satellite outage incidents are occurring
35F	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.5		Check with Newmexian supreme military command to determine if other military incidents are occurring to Newmexian and allied forces
351	Space Surveillance	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.8		Increase surveillance and tracking for new and suspicious space objects
35J	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.9		Increase mission identification and country of origin determination for new and suspicious space objects (Space Object Identification - SOI)
35K	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.10		Increase signals intelligence collection on new and suspicious space objects
35L	Satellites	Orgonia	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.11		Maneuver Orgonian Abragh Nano LEO Inspector Satellite close to Newmex Bicudo Large LEO Photo Satellite for close inspection to help determine origin of mission degradations
35M	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	9	N.S.R.3.12		Increase satellite imagery, OPIR and RADAR surveillance and signals intelligence collection of Newmexian border areas
35N	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	8	N.S.R.3.13		Increase satellite imagery, OPIR and RADAR surveillance and signals intelligence collection of Newmexian internal areas
350	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.14		Increase satellite imagery, OPIR and RADAR surveillance and signals intelligence collection of internal Califon activities
35P	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	9	N.S.R.3.15		Increase satellite imagery, OPIR and RADAR surveillance and signals intelligence collection of Califon allied activities
35Q	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.16		Increase critical infrastructures defenses and surveillance
35AG	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	5	N.S.R.3.32		Cutoff diplomatic relations with Califon
35AP	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	9	N.S.R.3.41		Increase world attention to the problems of orbital space debris in order to slow down Califon's launching of new satellites
35BB	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.53		Engage in negotiations for space treaties and mutual defense pacts with other countries to increase space defense protection
35BC	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.54		Publically declare that any use of space weapons against Newmexian satellites will have a corresponding attack on the aggressor's space facilities associated with this attack, whether they be research centers, launch facilities, space surveillance sites, or command and control centers
35BD	Political	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	9	N.S.R.3.55		Publically declare that any use of space weapons against Newmexian satellites will have a corresponding attack on the aggressor's and their allies space facilities associated with this attack, whether they be research centers, launch facilities, space surveillance sites, or command and control centers
35BE	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	8	N.S.R.3.56		Initiate multiple false starts, threatening space and terrestrial maneuvers, etc. to induce your adversaries to begin constant satellite maneuvering, so as to waste their on-board fuel reserves before actual conflict starts
35BF	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	8	N.S.R.3.57		Initiate random military orders, communications traffic, re-deployments and satellite maneuvers to confuse potential adversaries of your immediate plans and goals
35BG	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	7	N.S.R.3.58		Launch or maneuver a new mysterious satellite that comes close to critical Califon satellites, to make Califon pause in its military execution plans, to show resolve, and as a warning to Califon to back down
35BH	ASAT	Newmex	Califon	P.1.B.0	10	N.S.R.3.59		Jam Califon propaganda broadcasts from their communications satellites directed at Newmexian dissidents
35BI	ASAT	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	10	N.S.R.3.60		Initiate operational deployment of Newmexian Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems

COA Reactions Example (Cont.)

Time	1			Escalation	Probability		1		
Sequence	Category	Actor	Target	Ladder	of Occurrence	WBS	Action	Reaction	
Jequence	category	Actor	laiget		oroccurrence	WDS		Attack Califon Darapi Large LEO Photo Satellite with a Lagoa Mobile Ground Jammer-RF that temporarily denies Califon access to its intelligence	
35BJ	ASAT	Newmex	Califon	P.3.A.1	8	N.S.R.3.61	$ \rightarrow $	collection capabilities, to show resolve and as a warning to Califon to back down	
								Attack Califon Darapi Large LEO Photo Satellite with an Ouro Space Launch ASAT Ground Mobile Missile that permanently destroys it, to show	
35BK	ASAT	Newmex	Califon	P.4.A.2	6	N.S.R.3.62		resolve and as a warning to Califon to back down	
								Attack Califon Darapi Large LEO Photo Satellite with an Orgonian Dimbabah Nano LEO Mine-Paint that temporarily denies Califon access to its	
35BL	ASAT	Orgonia	Califon	P.3.A.2	9	N.S.R.3.63		intelligence collection capabilities (covers lenses with temporary paint), to show resolve and as a warning to Califon to back down	
								Attack Califon Jeanton Large Ground Fixed Command Center with a cyber attack that temporarily disables its ability to command forces, to show	
35BM	Cyber	Newmex	Califon	P.2.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.64		resolve and as a warning to Califon to back down	
								Attack Califon Jeanton Large Ground Fixed Command Center with Newmexian Irece SOF forces that permanently disables its ability to command	
35BN	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.3.A.2	5	N.S.R.3.65		forces, to show resolve and as a warning to Califon to back down	
35BO	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.2.A.0	5	N.S.R.3.66		Attack a Califon terrestrial system of similar military and economic value to deter Califon from further aggression	
35BP	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	10	N.S.R.3.67		Attack by cyber means the Califon facility that caused the Newmex Bicudo Large LEO Photo Satellite to be temporarily or permanently damaged	
								Attack by Newmexian Irece SOF forces the Califon facility that caused the Newmex Bicudo Large LEO Photo Satellite to be temporarily or	
35BQ	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.2.A.0	5	N.S.R.3.68		permanently damaged	
								Attack by the Newmexian Air Force Califon's facility that caused the Newmex Bicudo Large LEO Photo Satellite to be temporarily or permanently	
35BR	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.4.A.2	3	N.S.R.3.69		damaged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
35BY	Industrial	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.76		Prepare any remaining satellite launch facilities for rapid reaction capabilities enabling quick satellite launches	
35BZ	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.77		Increase on-orbit spares for critical satellites	
35CA	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	9	N.S.R.3.78		Increase on-orbit satellite decoys to confuse Califon and its allies' space surveillance networks	
25.00	C + 1111		0.111	P.1.C.0		N C D D 70		Initiate war-reserve modes for critical Newmexian satellite assets that begin to maneuver and reduce RADAR and optical signatures to avoid Califon	
35CB	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	8	N.S.R.3.79		and its allies' space surveillance networks	
35CC	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.80		Recharge Newmexian satellite batteries on-orbit	
35CD	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.81		Refuel Newmexian satellites on-orbit	
35CE	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.82		Refuel Newmexian space support sites backup generators	
35CF	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.83		Maneuver Newmexian space weapons (space-based and terrestrial-based) into optimized offensive and defensive positions	
35CG	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.84		Deploy Newmexian space support assets (space-based and terrestrial-based) into optimized offensive and defensive support positions	
								Maneuver and deploy space control assets that later enable sealing off the Earth from adversary satellites, in order to fix these adversary space	
35CH	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.85		assets into a steady state that cannot be changed from the ground. This would including positioning for jamming, spoofing and cyber attacks, along	
								with denying an adversary the ability to launch new satellites	
35CI	Launch	Newmex	Orgonia	P.1.A.0	8	N.S.R.3.86		Request Orgonia provide satellite launch support from its Nuwayr Space Launch Ground Mobile Systems for Newmexian satellites	
35CJ	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.87		Explore non-space mission replacements for reduced satellite capabilities	
35CP	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	9	N.S.R.3.93		Increase surveillance, protection and defenses of space systems terrestrial terminals, command and control sites, space sensor sites, launch sites,	
		-						space weapons marshaling areas, research centers and factories	
35CQ	Environmental	Space	Space	P.1.B.0	9	N.S.R.3.94		Increase surveillance of solar events to better determine if potential satellite outages are caused by natural or human intents	
35CR	Forces	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	10	N.S.R.3.95		Determine if Califon and/or their allies have terrestrial forces maneuvering or deploying to operational locations and appear to be pre-positioning	
	a		a. 116				-	for attack	
35CS	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.C.0	10	N.S.R.3.96		Command critical Newmexian satellites to initiate defensive measures (spinning, close shutters, increased heat transfer, etc.)	
35CT	Satellites	Newmex	Califon Newmex	P.1.B.0 P.1.A.0	9 10	N.S.R.3.97		Maneuver critical Newmexian satellites beyond the range of potential threats	
35CU 35CV	Satellites	Newmex Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0 P.1.A.0	10 9	N.S.R.3.98 N.S.R.3.99		Conduct a full battery of diagnostic testing on Newmexian satellites to determine if intermittent failures are a possibility	
35CV 35CW	Launch Forces		Newmex	P.1.A.0 P.1.A.0	9 10	N.S.R.3.99 N.S.R.3.100	-	If critical Newmexian satellites are permanently damaged, then launch other satellites with similar capabilities	
35CW 35CX	Forces		Newmex	P.1.A.0 P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.100 N.S.R.3.101		Determine the effects on the overall space system mission of any space systems degradations Modify previously planned space strategies and tactics due to current adversary and their allies' actions	
35CX 35CY	Satellites	Newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	N.S.R.3.101			
3501	Satemites	newmex	Califon	P.1.A.0	10	IN.S.K.3.102		Increase training for satellite operators that allows them to recognize intentional attacks and respond promptly	

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Space Escalation Ladder

WBS	Conflict Phase	Terrestrial Campaign Phase	Space Campaign Phase	Weapon Type	Space Campaign Phase Full Name	Weapon Category
P.1.A.0	Pre-Conflict	Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape)	1st Wave Attacks Phase A	Pre-Conflict Deter	1st Wave Attacks Phase A - Pre-Conflict Deter	Overt Weapons Testing & Deployment; Treaties; Saber Rattling; Space Alliances; Normal Space Surveillance, Tracking & Reconnaissance Activities
P.1.B.0	Pre-Conflict	Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape)	1st Wave Attacks Phase B	Persuade; Spying; Propaganda; Avoidance Maneuvering; Increased Space Surveillance & Close Satellite Inspections		Diplomatic Requests & Démarches; Economic Actions; Embargos; Legal Actions; Administrative Actions; Transmitting Propaganda Broadcasts; Jamming Propaganda Broadcasts; Increased Spying & Surveillance; Unusual Increases in Space Surveillance and Tracking Activities; Satellite Close Inspectors; Threaten Allies of Your Adversaries; Maneuver to Avoid Attacks
P.1.C.0	Pre-Conflict	Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape)	1st Wave Attacks Phase C	Hide; Covert; Cyber; Political Disruptions; Mobilize Forces; Increase Military Alert Level; Threatening Satellite Maneuvers; Increase Space Radiation; Initiate Satellite Defensive Measures; Employ Nation's Astronauts on International Space Station for Military Uses	1st Wave Attacks Phase C - Pre-Conflict Hide	Camouflage; Stop Activities; Mobility; Covert Technology Developments; Small Covert Attacks; Cyber Attacks; Provocative but False Attacks; Covert Actions in Violation of International Treaties; Cutoff Diplomatic Relations; Inspire Social Disruptions and Agitation; Employ Lethal Force Against Your Own Citizens; Mobilize Forces; Increase Military Alert Level (DEFCON); Maneuver Close Enough to Adversary Satellites to Purposely Appear as a Threat; Reveal Covert Programs to Appear Threatening; Enter Into War-Reserve Modes (Hide) for Critical Satellites; Hide Senior Leadership; Increase Radiation Environment in Orbits Used by Adversaries; Initiate Satellite Defensive Measures; Employ Nation's Astronauts on International Space Station for Military Reconnaissance and Surveillance
P.2.A.0	Trans-Conflict	Phase I: Deployment / Deterrence (Deter)	2nd Wave Attacks	Trans-Conflict Deter		Linked Attacks; Demo Attacks; Alternate Country Attacks; Blockades; Major Covert Attacks; Terrorist Attacks; Summarily Execute Saboteurs; Seize & Sequester Suspected Terrorists; Alert Anti-Satellite Systems; Arm Satellite Self-Defense Mechanisms; Alert Anti-Missile Defenses; Alert Anti-Aircraft Defenses; Arm Allied Astronauts on International Space Station

Space Actions May Be Conducted Pre-Conflict

Space Escalation Ladder (Cont.)

WBS	Conflict Phase	Terrestrial Campaign Phase	Space Campaign Phase	Weapon Type	Space Campaign Phase Full Name	Weapon Category
P.3.A.1	Trans-Conflict	Phase II: Halt Incursion (Seize Initiative)	3rd Wave Attacks Phase A1– Gnd Based	From Terrestrial Partial Temporary Kill	3rd Wave Attacks Phase A1–Terrestrial- to-Space Partial Temporary Effects	Delay, Deny, Covertly Assassinate Adversary Diplomatic Ambassador
P.3.A.2	Trans-Conflict	Phase II: Halt Incursion (Seize Initiative)	3rd Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Gnd Based	From Terrestrial Total Temporary Kill	3rd Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Terrestrial- to-Space Total Temporary Effects	Disrupt
P.3.B.1	Trans-Conflict	Phase III: Air Counter-Offensive (Dominate)	3rd Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space Based	From Space Partial Temporary Kill	3rd Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space-to- Space Partial Temporary Effects	Delay, Deny
P.3.B.2	Trans-Conflict	Phase III: Air Counter-Offensive (Dominate)	3rd Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space Based	From Space Total Temporary Kill	3rd Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space-to- Space Total Temporary Effects	Disrupt
P.4.A.1	Trans-Conflict	Phase IV: Joint Counter-Offensive to Restore Friendly Pre-Conflict Status (Stabilize Borders)	4th Wave Attacks Phase A1– Gnd Based	From Terrestrial Partial Permanent Kill	4th Wave Attacks Phase A1–Terrestrial- to-Space Partial Permanent Kill	Degrade
P.4.A.2	Trans-Conflict	Phase IV: Joint Counter-Offensive to Restore Friendly Pre-Conflict Status (Stabilize Borders)	4th Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Gnd Based	From Terrestrial Total Permanent Kill	4th Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Terrestrial- to-Space Total Permanent Kill	Destroy
P.4.B.1	Trans-Conflict	Phase V: Joint Counter-Offensive to Capture Adversary Capitol (Enable New	4th Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space Based	From Space Partial Permanent Kill	4th Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space-to- Space Partial Permanent Kill	Degrade
P.4.B.2	Trans-Conflict	Phase V: Joint Counter-Offensive to Capture Adversary Capitol (Enable New	4th Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space Based	From Space Total Permanent Kill	4th Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space-to- Space Total Permanent Kill	Destroy
P.5.A.0		Phase VI: Defend Against Adversary Counter-Attacks Against Friendly Homeland (Defend Friendly Citizens)	5th Wave Attacks	Space-Manned Permanent Kill: Kill Adversary Astronauts	Sth Wave Attacks - Space-Manned Permanent Kill	Degrade, Destroy: Kill Adversary Astronauts on International Space Station
P.6.A.0		Phase VI: Defend Against Adversary Counter-Attacks Against Friendly Homeland (Defend Friendly Citizens)	6th Wave Attacks	Space-to-Earth Permanent Kill	6th Wave Attacks - Space-to-Earth Permanent Kill	Degrade, Destroy
P.7.A.0		Phase VII: Defend Against Adversary Use of Nuclear Weapons in Space (Defend Friendly Military)	7th Wave Attacks	NBC Use - Space	7th Wave Attacks - NBC Use - Space	Degrade, Destroy
P.8.A.0		Phase VIII: Defend Against Adversary Use of NBC Against Friendly Military Targets (Defend Friendly Military)	8th Wave Attacks; Phase A – Military Targets	NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial	8th Wave Attacks Phase A – NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial - Military Targets	Degrade, Destroy
P.8.B.0	Trans-Conflict	Phase IX: Defend Against Adversary Use of NBC Against All Friendly Targets (Defend Friendly Military & Civilians)	8th Wave Attacks; Phase B – Civilian Targets	NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial	8th Wave Attacks Phase B – NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial - Civilian Targets	Degrade, Destroy
P.9.A.0	Post-Conflict	Phase X: Post-Hostilities (Reconstruction & Stabilization)	9th Wave Attacks	Post-Conflict Deter	9th Wave Attacks - Post-Conflict Deter	Diplomatic Requests; Economic Actions; Legal Actions; Administrative Actions; Jamming Propaganda Broadcasts

Space Provides Finer Gradations & Thus Better Control During Conflict Escalation

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Space Web Ontology


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Space Ontology

- 1,009 Objects: Classes, Properties, Instances
- Most Classes Have Documented Instances
- Classes:
 - Military Objectives & Tasks (8 Levels)
 - Conflict Levels
 - Campaign Phases
 - Success Criteria
 - Success Indicators
 - Space Battle Zones
 - Space Centers Of Gravity
 - Space Principles of War
 - Space Escalation Ladder
 - Space NIIRS
 - Satellite Keep-Out Zones

Space Ontology Example



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SSA Requirements Study

- Reviewed Doctrine Docs, Joint Pubs, Air Force Glossaries, Air Force Instructions, Air Force Pamphlets, Army Field Manuals, National Defense University Handbook, and Multiservice Procedures
 - 55 Total Documents Analyzed
- Terrestrial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Principles Extrapolated to Space

– ~1,900 Different Space Control / SSA Requirements

SSA-T Baselines Space Control/SSA Requirements From Fundamental Military Doctrine

Example SSA Requirements Matrix

INTEL Derived From	INTEL Requirements	INTEL Indicators	Resolution Requirements	Space NIIRS	Detection Means	Technologies	
Basic Characterization	Satellite Current Orientation Attitude	Satellite Current Cross Section	1.2 - 2.5	4	Imagery or RADAR	Optical or RADAF	
Basic Characterization	Satellite Has Changed Attitude From Spinning or 3-Axis Stability	Satellite Cross Section Change	2.5 - 4.5	3	Optical or RADAR Cross Section	Optical or RADAF	
Detailed Characterization	Satellite Current Weapons Suite Pointing Direction	Satellite Weapons Suite Image	0.20 - 0.40	7	Imagery	Optical	
Exquisite Characterization	Satellite Delta-V Remaining Capability	Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Fluid Level	N/A	N/A	RF Signal Monitoring	RF Receivers	
		Satellite Propulsion Tank Thermal Image	0.20 - 0.40	7	Imagery	Optical-IR	
Exquisite Characterization	Satellite Propulsion Tank Fluid Status	Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Fluid Status	N/A	N/A	RF Signal Monitoring	RF Receivers	
		Satellite Propulsion Tank Thermal Image	0.20 - 0.40	7	Imagery	Optical-IR	
Exquisite Characterization	Satellite Current On-Board Processor State	Satellite Telemetry Indicates On-Board Processor State	N/A	N/A	RF Signal Monitoring	RF Receivers	
Exquisite Characterization	Satellite Propulsion Tank Internal Pressure	Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Internal Pressure	N/A	N/A	RF Signal Monitoring	RF Receivers	
Detailed Characterization	Satellite Current Detailed Thermal Signature	Satellite Thermal Image	0.20 - 0.40	7	Imagery	Optical-IR	

← 1,900 Other SSA Requirements

SSA Requirements Linked to Sensor Resolutions

NIIRS Space Equivalents Defined

NIIRS Rating	GRD (m)	Terrestrial Examples	Space Equivalent Examples
0		Interpretability of the imagery is precluded by obscuration, degradation, or very poor resolution	Satellite features in shadow
1	9	Detect the presence of aircraft dispersal parking areas.	Characterize very large (e.g., International Space Station) space object.
2	4.5 - 9.0	Detect the presence of large (e.g., Boeing 737, 747, Airbus A-300, MD-80) aircraft.	Characterize large (e.g., GEO Communications satellite) space object.
3	2.5 - 4.5	Detect medium-sized aircraft (e.g., F-15). Identify an ORBITA site on the basis of a 12 meter dish antenna normally mounted on a circular building.	Characterize medium (e.g., DMSP) space object.
4	1.2 - 2.5	Identify the wing configuration of small fighter aircraft (e.g., F- 16). Detect large (e.g., greater than 10 meter diameter) environmental domes at an electronics facility.	Detect if large (e.g., TDRS) solar panel has deployed.
5	0.75 - 1.2	Distinguish between single-tail (e.g., F-16) and twin-tailed (e.g., F-15) fighters. Detect automobile in a parking lot. Identify the metal lattice structure of large (e.g. approximately 75 meter) radio relay towers.	Determine large (e.g., TDRS) solar panel design configuration. Determine satellite attitude/spin rate. Determine if satellite has broken up into large pieces.
6	0.40 - 0.75	Detect wing-mounted stores (i.e., ASM, bombs) protruding from the wings of large bombers (e.g., B-52). Identify the spare tire on a medium-sized truck.	Determine existence of medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antennas.
7	0.20 - 0.40	Identify antenna dishes (less than 3 meters in diameter) on a radio relay tower. Identify individual 55-gallon drums. Detect small marine mammals (e.g., harbor seals) on sand/gravel beaches. Identify ports, ladders, vents on electronics vans. Identify ind	Determine attitude of medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antennas. Determine large area degradation of solar panel optical quality.
8	0.10 - 0.20	Identify the rivet lines on bomber aircraft. Detect horn-shaped and W- shaped antennas mounted atop BACKTRAP and BACKNET radars. Identify windshield wipers on a vehicle. Identify limbs (e.g., arms, legs) on an individual. Identify individual horizontal and	Determine medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antenna damage.
9	<0.10	Identify screws and bolts on missile components. Detect individual spikes in railroad ties. Identify individual rungs on bulkhead mounted ladders. Identify vehicle registration numbers (VRN) on trucks.	Detect orbital thruster damage. Detect if optical covers have been removed.

Similar to AFRL SORS (Space Object Rating Scale)

NIIRS = National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale

Space NIIRS Based on Equivalent Terrestrial NIIRS Definitions

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SSA-T Automatic Space Object Classification

- Unknown Space Object Characteristics Compared to Selected Space Objects In Databases
- 98% of the Time the Correct Mission for the Unknown Object is Within the Top 3 Choices SSA-T Automatically Makes
- SSA-T Has Corrected USSPACECOM Satellite Catalog Mistakes In Mission Assessments

SSA-T Helps the Satellite Analyst In Determining Surveillance Tasking Priorities

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Scenario Partial Example 1

Weapon	INTEL	INTEL	WBS	Nane				
rroupon	Type 1	Type 2	Code		8 AM	9 AM	10 AM	11 AM
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	SIGINT	8	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Launch Situation	U AM			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	SIGINT		Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Launch Profile Does Not Look Like IRBM Surface-to-Surface Lau				
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT	1	8.2	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - No Detrimental Weather Conditions for Launch				1121 1121
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT	1	8.2.1	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - No Detrimental Weather Conditions for Launch - No Heavy F				
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT	1	8.2.2	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - No Detrimental Weather Conditions for Launch - Low Chanc				
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT	1	8.3	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Newmanian Satellite Approaching from Over the Horizon Within 1				
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT		8.4	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Newmanian Satellite Approaching from Over the Horizon Within 1				
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT		8.5	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - TEL Removed from Shelter / Camouflage	D			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT		8.6	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Vehicle Chucks / Levelers / Stabilizers Extended	۱ Č			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT		8.7	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Seals Removed	ù 🏠			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT		8.8	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - TEL Erects Missile	Ŏ.			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT		8.9	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - TEL Moves Away from Missile	Ŏ			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	COMINT	8.10	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Final Checks & Tests	<u>ب</u>			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	COMINT	8.10.1	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Test Missile Sub-Systems	ו 👗	<u>}</u>		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT		8.10.2	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Test Launch Control Vehicle to Missile COMM	ч	ě,		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	COMINT		8.10.3	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Test Space Center to Launch Control Vehicle COMM	(
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	COMINT		8.10.4	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Test Command Center to Space Center COMM	t.	<u>6</u>		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	SIGINT	8.10.5	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Launch Rehearsal	1	Ŏ.		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.11	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Calibrate Inertial Guidance System	1	Ď.		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	COMINT		8.12	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Receive Final Target Orbital Elements	1	Č,		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.13	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Upload Final Target Orbital Elements	1	- K		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.14	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Top-Off Seeker Coolant	1	d.		
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.15	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Arm Batteries	1	ì	<u>r</u>	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	FISINT	8.16	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Hard-Point Attachments Released	1		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.17	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Booster Separation Squibs Armed	1		ě.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	HUMINT	COMINT	8.18	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Countdown Sequence Initiated	1		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.19	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Functions Transferred to Internal Power	1		Ĕ.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	COMINT	HUMINT	8.20	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Authenticated Launch Codes Received	l.		ť,	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	HUMINT		Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Officer Selects Missile from Battery	l.		- <u>6</u>	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	HUMINT	8.22	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Officer Inserts Key Into Launch Control Console	l.		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	HUMINT	8.23	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Officer Lifts Cover from Launch Switch	l.		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	ELINT	HUMINT	8.24	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Officer Operates Launch Switch	l.		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.25	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Engine Started	l.		Ĕ.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.26	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Begin Thrust Chamber Pressure Buildup	l.		Ĕ.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.27	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Hold-Down-Bolts Fired	1		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.28	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Umbilicals Released	l.			
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.29	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Launch	l.		Ť	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASINT	8.29.1	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Launch - Plume Present	l.		ا ي	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT		8.29.2	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Launch - Loud Auditory Signal	l.		Ĺ	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASIN	-			7	6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASI	Pa	ttle in the Blue Scenario Time Lines in Microsoft Pro	hight		Ł	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	IMINT	MASIN	Da	the in the Dive Scenario Time Lines in Microsoft Pr	vjeci		£.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT					_	Č.	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT		Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Telemetry Data Links Increased Bandwidth	l.		ļč	•
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	MASINT		8.34	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile Flies Through Atmosphere	l.		6	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.35	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Site Personnel Staring Up at the Sky	l.		Ĺ	
Mobile Direct Ascent ASAT	FISINT	TELINT	8.36	Koronean Tubul Mobile DA ASAT Attack Against Newmanian Goy En LEO Photo Satellite - Missile First Stage Shutdown	l		Ĩ	

Scenario Partial Example 2

US Tactical Objective S2-8. Deny North Korea space-based surveillance and reconnaissance information

Purpose: Deny North Korea ability to gather information on coalition forces using space-based assets

Success Criterion:

S2-8.1: North Korea unable to receive space-based surveillance and reconnaissance information

Concept: Increase time and resources required for North Korea to gather information on coalition strength and force disposition

Tactical Tasks:

S2-8.1.1: Prevent North Korea forces from gathering ISR information using indigenous space-based assets

Concept: Eliminate North Korea surveillance and reconnaissance assets affecting the Coalition operations

Success Indicator:

IND: North Korea surveillance and reconnaissance interrupted

IND: Coalition space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capability remains uninterrupted

S 2-8.1.2: Prevent North Korea forces from acquiring third- party/commercial ISR information

Concept: Deny North Korea ability to purchase/obtain ISR data from third-party/Commercial sources

Deny third party capability to image selected protected areas

Success Indicator:

IND: No commercial source sells North Korea ISR data

IND: Third parties unable to pass ISR data to North Korea


IND: Third party unable to collect ISR data over selected protected area

Space Objectives Available Also

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Scenario Partial Example 3



Detailed Space Control Scenarios Available for Analyses

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Space Info Choke Points Network Analyses


- SHIVA (Space Highest Information Value Assessment)
 - PC-Based In Microsoft Access
 - Performs Links & Nodes Network Analysis
 Showing Value of Information to the Warfighter
 - Can Conduct Red Or Blue Targeting/Vulnerability Analyses
 - Algorithms & Software Validated by RAND

SHIVA Can Show the Value of Space Systems

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
SHIVA Methodology



SHIVA Calculates All Possible Paths Between Sensors and Shooters



SSA & SAW Integrated Concept




Predict an Adversary's Intentions & Next Moves Against Space Systems


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SSA & SAW Detail 1



SSA & SAW Detail 2



Proposed SSA-T Future Developments

- Evolve Most Threatening Regions of Space Displays (SAW)
 - Develop Delta-V vs. Transit Time Maps
 - Display Non-RPO Attack Modes (Iridium 33 vs. Cosmos 2251)
 - ✓IMPACT: Increased Ability to Predict Space Attacks, & Help Prevent Terrestrial War; Also, Better Optimized Tasking of INTEL Sensors
- Expand SSA-T Space Game Developments
 - Develop Lists of Best Red Space Attack Strategies Assuming Certain Types of Weapon Systems
 - Determine the INTEL Indicators of These Types of Attacks
 - ✓IMPACT: Increased Ability to Predict Red Space Intentions, & Help Prevent Terrestrial War; Also, Better Optimized Tasking of INTEL Sensors
- Auto Space Missile Launch Identification
 - Adapt Proven SSA-T State Change Algorithms to Automatically Predict Satellite Launch Times & Missions Using SIGINT Data
 - ✓IMPACT: Automated Space Launch Typing Allows Faster Threat Mitigation Timelines Translating to Better War-Winning Space Strategies

Small Investment Leveraged Into War-Winning Space Control / SSA Battle Management